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Re-Situating Utopia  




This article considers utopian international legal thought. It makes three inter-connected 
arguments. First, it argues that international law and international legal theory are dominated 
by a ‘blueprint’ utopianism that presents international law as the means of achieving a better 
global future. Second, it argues that such blueprintism makes international law into what 
philosopher Louis Marin describes as a “degenerate utopia” – a fantastical means of trapping 
thought and practice within contemporary social and political conditions, blocking any 
possibility that those conditions might be transcended. Third, it argues for an iconoclastic 
international legal utopianism – Utopia not as a ‘blueprint’ for a better future, operating within 
the confines of existing social and political reality, but as a means of seeking to negate and exit 
from that reality – as the only way to maintain the idea that international law offers a path 
towards a truly better future.    
Keywords 
Utopianism – international legal theory – iconoclasm – law and literature – law and philosophy 
– climate change 
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Introduction: Blueprints and Iconoclasm 
In this article I propose a re-situation of utopia in international legal thinking, a shift in the way 
that international legal thinking conceptualises utopia. Attempts to use international law to 
realise an actual utopia – the notion that “utopia can perhaps finally become incarnate” through 
“[a] new New International Economic Order,”1 for example – are, I suggest, misconceived.2 
Such “blueprint” utopianism dominates contemporary international law,3 producing a formal, 
mythical international law – a “degenerate utopia”4 – that sells a dream of itself as the path to 
a better global future.5 By deflecting attention away from “the [contemporary] concrete 
historical situation,”6 from the scale, depth and intractability of contemporary inequalities and 
injustices, that dream offers false hope.  
In place of “blueprint” attempts to realise utopia through international law it is, I argue, 
important to recognise that  
utopia is somehow negative … it is most authentic when we cannot imagine it. Its function 
lies not in helping us to imagine a better future but rather in demonstrating our utter 
incapacity to imagine such a future … reveal[ing in the process] the ideological closure 
of the system in which we are somehow trapped and confined.7  
Utopianism is not, then, a means of planning a better future; rather, it charts the limits of 
contemporary thought and practice. This “iconoclastic utopianism” confronts the challenge of 
finding a way to overcome the contemporary inability to imagine a future radically different 
from the present.8  
                                                          
1 Emmanuelle Jouannet, “How to Depart from the Existing Dire Condition of Development” in Antonio Cassese 
(ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 392, 393.   
2 See, for example, Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2012).  
3 On ‘blueprint’ utopianism see Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age 
(Columbia University Press, 2005), xiv, commenting on the ‘blueprint’ utopian literature of, for example, Thomas 
More and Edward Bellamy: “The blueprint utopians map out the future in inches and minutes. From the eating 
arrangements to the subject of conversation the blueprinters – by far the largest group of utopians – gave precise 
instructions.”  
4 “degenerate utopia” – Louis Marin (Robert A. Vollrath tr.), Utopics: Spatial Play (Humanities Press, 1984), 
239: “A degenerate utopia is ideology changed into the form of myth … Myth is a narrative that resolves formally 
a fundamental social contradiction.”  
5  Walter Benjamin (Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin tr.), The Arcades Project (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 4, (quoting Jules Michelet): "‘Each epoch dreams the one to follow.’” Susan Buck Morss, 
The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (MIT Press, 1991), 120: “dream symbols are 
the fetishized desires that advertise commodities.”   
6 Benjamin, Arcades (n 5) 391 (K 2,3).   
7 Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia” (2004) 25 New Left Review 35, 46.  
8 Jacoby (n 3) xvii-xviii: “[T]he iconoclastic utopians … [were] resistan[t] to representing the future. They not 
only obeyed the taboo on graven images, they teetered on the edge of silence about what could be. If the future 
defied representation, however, it did not defy hope. The iconoclastic utopians were utopians against the current. 
They did not surrender to the drumbeat of everyday emergencies. Nor did they paint utopia in glowing colors.” 
See also Jacoby, ibid 85: “The Jewish tradition gave rise to what might be called an iconoclastic utopianism – an 
anti-utopian utopianism that resisted blueprints. This iconoclastic utopianism was ‘anti-utopian’ to the extent that 
it refused to map out the future; it was utopian in its commitment to a very different future of harmony and 
happiness. The iconoclastic utopians inclined toward the future, but unlike the blueprint utopians, they abstained 
from depicting it.”  
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The re-situation or shift in international legal thinking I am proposing involves a move from 
an idea of utopia as a future place planned out in international legal blueprints, to an idea of 
utopia as a marker of the sense in which international law is “trapped and confined” within 
contemporary reality. The first part of this article outlines iconoclastic utopianism in more 
detail. The second part – ‘Blueprints’ – argues that international law maintains an image of 
itself as a means of planning utopia, a “blueprint” or set of “blueprints” for a better future. I 
critique the variant forms of this blueprint perspective, focussing on Antonio Cassese’s realistic 
utopianism,9 Martti Koskenniemi’s concern with utopia, particularly in his seminal From 
Apology to Utopia,10 Philip Allott’s utopian effort to “re-imagine the human world by 
proposing a new ideal of international society,”11 and Samuel Moyn’s work on utopianism and 
human rights.12 Cassese, Koskenniemi, Allott and Moyn are the most significant theorists of 
utopianism in the international legal literature, hence the analysis of their work that follows. 
I argue that contemporary international law serves to “represent … the imaginary relationship 
individuals maintain with their real conditions of existence,”13 “a stage for ideological 
representation,”14 a “[m]yth … that resolves [but only] formally [the] ... fundamental social 
contradiction[s]” of life on earth.15 Characterising international law’s blueprint utopianism in 
these terms – that is, in terms of ideology, myth and formality – the third part of this article 
depicts international law as a “degenerate utopia,” a term borrowed from philosopher Louis 
Marin’s 1982 analysis of Disneyland (California).16 Connecting international law’s 
contemporary situation with Marin’s Disneyland analysis, I argue that international law’s 
representation of itself as a path to a better future blocks awareness of the sense in which it is 
now both impossible and essential to imagine a genuine future – a future that does not simply 
reproduce the present.   
In opposition to blueprintism and international law’s degenerate utopianism the fourth and final 
part of the article makes the case for iconoclastic international legal utopianism. Iconoclastic 
utopianism is, then, the beginning and the end of my argument, the destination I seek to achieve 
and the foundation for my critique. It makes sense, then, to start by considering iconoclastic 
utopianism in more detail.  
Part 1: Iconoclastic Utopianism, or “Exiting the Series” 
Writing about utopianism and climate change, science fiction author Kim Stanley Robinson 
notes the impossibility of “[i]magining a positive history that gets us to a better state” whilst 
                                                          
9 See Antonio Cassese, “Introduction” in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) xvii.  
10 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument – Reissue with 
New Epilogue (Cambridge University Press, 2005, first published – without epilogue – in 1989). 
11 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press, 2001 (paperback edition, first 
published in 1990)) xxvi.  
12 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2010), and part 2(4) below.  
13 Marin, Utopics (n 4) 239.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
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insisting on the importance of utopianism in “a significantly damaged biosphere.”17 For 
Robinson “utopia has gone from being a somewhat minor literary problem to a necessary 
survival strategy.”18 In the face of something so all-encompassing as climate change utopia 
becomes a “game of pure contradiction.”19 The impossible and the essential become 
unachievable yet complementary sides of a utopian process that seeks to “neutral[ise]” what is 
by offering “the signal for exiting the series” – the system, the international legal order – and 
“entering into a modifiable destiny.”20  
Utopia as no-place (Ou-topia) becomes the only Eutopia the only (available) good place.21 The 
‘no-place / good place’ dialectic expresses the sense in which “[w]e acknowledge this [utopian] 
place, rather than have knowledge of it [because] [t]he [utopian] ‘position’ is … unable to be 
occupied as such.”22 To think utopia and live with(in) climate change is to pursue the 
impossible optimistically, accepting the ‘no place’ impossibility of a life beyond “a 
significantly damaged biosphere” whilst,23 at the same time, acknowledging the ‘good’ of that 
life and the need to work for it: “utopia as a form is not the representation of radical alternatives; 
it is rather simply the imperative to imagine them.”24 Iconoclastic utopianism seeks to negate 
contemporary life (including contemporary international law), approaching the essentially 
negative question of why a better future has not been and is not in the process of being realised 
as the positive foundation for radical changes in contemporary thought and action.25  
For sociologist Zygmunt Bauman contemporary ideas of happiness involve the reproduction 
of the present in place of any attempt to build a genuine future: “happiness means now a 
different today rather than a more felicitous tomorrow, as it did in the past.”26 The permanence 
of commodified existence makes fundamental social change unimaginable:  
                                                          
17 Kim Stanley Robinson, ‘Remarks on Utopia in the Age of Climate Change’ (2016) 27 Utopian Studies 2, 9.  
18 Ibid.   
19 Marin, Utopics (n 4) xxii.  
20 Ibid xix: “The neutral could be the name given to the signal for exiting the series and for entering into a 
modifiable destiny, in Bloch’s words. The neutral is the threshold limiting the inner and the outer, the place where 
exit and enter reverse and are fixed in this reversal; it is the name for all limits, provided by the thought of the 
limit: contradiction itself” (emphasis in original). See also Miguel Abensour, “Persistent Utopia” (2008) 15 
Constellations 406, 409: “Utopia would … be the exit, the escape of Being, not as Being, but only insofar as 
Being has become and in unfinished in its becoming. It is this non-achievement of Being, in its gap in relation to 
essence, that the persistence of utopia resides, the engine of enigmatic rebirth that all the world’s conservatives 
try to conceal by invoking an eternal utopia.”  
21 Abensour (n 20) 406: “Utopia is thus a playful name, fruit of [Thomas] More’s epigrammatic genius, that 
permanently oscillates between eu and ou, between the place where everything is good, the place of bliss 
(Eutopia), and the place of nowhere (Ou-topia).”   
22 Marin, Utopics (n 4) xix.  
23 “a significantly damaged biosphere” – see Robinson quotation at n 17.  
24 Fredric Jameson, “‘If I Can Find One Good City I Will Spare the Man’: Realism and Utopia in Kim Stanley 
Robinson’s Mars Trilogy” in Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other 
Science Fictions (Verso, 2007) 393, 416.  
25 See Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia” (n 7) 46: “utopianism involves a certain distance from the political 
institutions which encourages an endless play of fantasy around their possible reconstructions and 
restructurations.”  
26 Zygmunt Bauman, “Utopia with No Topos” (2003) 16(1) History of the Human Sciences 23, 24 (original in 




The globe is full. There are no as yet undiscovered places left and no place where one could 
hide from the order (or for that matter disorder) ruling (or for that matter misruling) in places 
already known and mapped, crisscrossed by beaten tracks, administered and managed. In 
this world, there is no more ‘outside.’27  
If everything and everywhere is inter-connected there can be no no-place:  
‘Utopia’ – in its original meaning of a place that does not exist – has become, within the 
logic of the globalized world, a contradiction in terms. The ‘nowhere’ (the ‘forever 
nowhere’, the ‘thus-far-nowhere’, and the ‘nowhere-as-yet’ alike) is no more a place.28  
To suggest otherwise via utopian blueprints dilutes the goodness or Eutopia of Utopia because 
of a failure to recognise the limits that contemporary social, political and economic conditions 
place on imagination and creativity. Contemporary utopianism must recognise that any 
blueprint for the future formed in contemporary commodified, consumerist globalised 
conditions will be determined by those conditions, by “our own absolute limits.”29 
Iconoclastic utopianism, in opposition to blueprint utopianism, emphasises the importance of 
contemporary conditions through a particular understanding of time, and its division into past, 
present and future. In The Political Unconscious cultural and literary theorist Fredric Jameson 
advocates a method of literary analysis that “foreground[s] the interpretive categories or codes 
through which we read and receive the text in question.”30 Jameson proposes this method in 
opposition to a focus on the internal aspects or “structures of a given cultural text.”31 For 
Jameson texts are to be understood in their cultural (including social and political) context, 
rather than in their own right or on their own terms. Expanding on this theme in his later work, 
Jameson argues that an understanding of the contemporary condition  the contemporary 
‘cultural logic’  is the foundation for analysis of contemporary conditions and any attempt to 
change them: “‘We have to name the system.’”32 As parts of “the system,” time and history are 
culturally conditioned categories or concepts: ‘the past’, ‘the present’ and ‘the future’ do not 
mean the same thing to all people, in all places, at all times. Those terms are to be understood 
by reference to the prevailing cultural conditions of any particular time or moment.  
Jameson attempts to capture prevailing, contemporary cultural conditions under the label 
‘postmodernism’, a famously contested term that he defines as “the consumption of sheer 
                                                          
27 Ibid 22.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Jameson, “Progress Versus Utopia, Or Can We Imagine the Future?” in Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the 
Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (Verso, 2007) 281, 288-289: “[Science fiction’s] 
deepest vocation is over and over again to demonstrate and to dramatize our incapacity to imagine the future, to 
body forth, through apparently full representations which prove on closer inspection to be structurally and 
constitutively impoverished, the atrophy in our time of what Marcuse has called the utopian imagination, the 
imagination of otherness and radical difference; to succeed by failure, to serve as unwitting and even unwilling 
vehicles for a meditation, which, setting forth into the unknown, finds itself irrevocably mired in the all-too-
familiar, and thereby becomes unexpectedly transformed into a contemplation of our own absolute limits” 
(emphasis in original). 
30 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a socially symbolic act (Routledge, 1983) ix.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Verso, 1991) 418.  
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commodification as a process.”33 Time and history are, on Jameson’s analysis, excluded or 
marginalised within postmodernism because of “historical deafness.”34 The resulting “crisis in 
historicity” originates in the cultural supremacy of consumption and commodification.35 That 
crisis manifests itself in “an increasingly absolute self-reproduction,”36 creating “a new and 
original historical situation in which we are condemned to seek History by way of our own pop 
images and simulacra of that history, which itself remains forever out of reach.”37 Engagement 
with the past functions at the level of “pastiche” – “the imitation of a peculiar or unique, 
idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language”38 – granting 
access to “a stereotypical past.”39 Rigorous inquiry into the minutiae of what was is sacrificed 
in pursuit of aesthetic appeal to present day audiences, because history as commodity will only 
sell if it “trace[s] our [present-day] mental images of [the] … past.”40 As a consequence, “the 
past is dead, transformed into a packet of well-worn and thumbed glossy images.”41  
Within the commodified conditions of the postmodern, the systemic structure of the present is 
as inaccessible or invisible as the past. The supremacy of aesthetics and the requirement for 
“absolute self-reproduction” means that “we seem increasingly incapable of fashioning 
representations of our own current experience.”42 Jameson proposes science-fiction (‘SF’) 
literature as the best available means of representing the present to ourselves: 
[T]he apparent realism, of representationality, of SF has concealed another, far more 
complex temporal structure: not to give us “images” of the future – whatever such images 
might mean for a reader who will necessarily predecease their “materialization” – but rather 
to defamiliarize and restructure our experience of our own present, and to do so in specific 
ways distinct from all other forms of defamilarization … [Marcel] Proust was only the most 
monumental “high” literary expression of this discovery: that the present – in this society, 
and in the physical and psychic dissociation of the human subjects who inhabit it – is 
inaccessible directly, is numb, habituated, empty of affect. Elaborate strategies of 
indirection are therefore necessary if we are somehow to break through our monadic 
insulation and to “experience”, for some first and real time, this “present”, which is after all 
all we have.43 
                                                          
33 Ibid x.  
34 Ibid xi. 
35 Ibid 25.  
36 Ibid 65 
37 Ibid 25.  
38 Ibid 17.  
39 Ibid 21.  
40 Ibid 25 (emphasis (‘our’) added): “[The] historical novel can no longer set out to represent the historical past; 
it can only ‘represent’ our ideas and stereotypes about that past (which thereby at one becomes ‘pop history’). 
Cultural production is thereby driven back inside a mental space which is no longer that of the old monadic subject 
but rather that of some degraded collective ‘objective spirit’: it can no longer gaze directly on some putative real 
world, at some reconstruction of a past history which was once itself a present; rather, as in Plato’s cave, it must 
trace our mental images of that past upon its confining walls.” 
41 Jameson, “Progress Versus Utopia” (n 29) 287.  
42 Jameson, Postmodernism (n 32) 21.  
43 Jameson, “Progress Versus Utopia” (n 29) 286-287.  
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If postmodern conditions insulate us from the fundamental nature or systematicity of present 
reality, they equally make a genuine future  a future fundamentally different from present 
reality  unimaginable: “the future … may still be alive in some small heroic collectivities on 
the Earth’s surface … [but] is for [most of] us either irrelevant or unthinkable.”44 This 
supposedly “eternal present” is a utopia 45 – a totalising vision of what exists as all there is, “as 
if the world itself can be the object of a final land survey,”46 an “exactly closed totality 
rigorously coded by all the constraints and obligations of the law binding and closing a place 
with insuperable frontiers that would guarantee its harmonious functioning.”47 In what follows 
I will argue that international legal utopianism has, to date, chosen to accept the limits of 
contemporary postmodern conditions, drafting blueprints whose content is (more or less 
consciously) determined by those conditions. I argue that international legal utopianism should 
chose the other option, embracing the impossible, iconoclastic “imperative” of imagining 
“radical alternatives” to contemporary reality.48 
Costas Douzinas, perhaps the only legal scholar to embrace iconoclastic utopianism, notes the 
impossibility of a genuine future, and of blueprints that seek to plan it from within present 
conditions:  
We cannot stop criticising the present and we cannot do that without adopting the position 
of the future; but, similarly, we can never remove ourselves sufficiently from our here and 
now to adopt the redemptive position. Utopian hope is necessary and impossible; a general 
utopian plan, if imposed on people, risks becoming a blueprint for worse oppression and 
domination.49 
The internal logic of a contemporary present that posits its own permanence makes the future 
“irrelevant or unthinkable.”50 The permanent and total has no concept of what lies beyond it 
because there is no ‘beyond’. With the fall of communism, the end of the Cold War, and the 
triumph of “free” markets history has (apparently) ended. Society, politics and human affairs 
have reached their end state and this, now, is utopia, is all there is.51 As scholar of utopian 
thought Ruth Levitas, writing in 2000, puts it: “[C]apitalism is widely held to be the only game 
in town … [and] [p]ost-1989, it might be said that we live, in an almost biblical sense, after the 
fall, but with no hope of redemption.”52  
                                                          
44 Ibid 287-288. 
45 “eternal present” - Fredric Jameson, The Antinomies of Realism (Verso, 2013) 24, 26, 28, 39-41.  
46 Louis Marin, “Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present” (1993) 19(3) Critical Inquiry 397, 399 
47 Ibid 403-404. 
48 See Jameson quotation at n 24.  
49 Costas Douzinas, “Human Rights and Postmodern Utopia” (2000) 11 Law and Critique 219, 238.  
50 “irrelevant or unthinkable” - see Jameson quotation at n 44.  
51 Douzinas, (n 49) 236: “The concept of utopia was dealt the first debilitating blow in the fifties and sixties when 
the Soviet gulags and mental asylums became widely known. It was deleted from the political dictionary with the 
collapse of communism. In this anti-utopian climate, Francis Fukuyama earned world-wide fame when he stated 
that ‘today, we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own, or a future that is not 
essentially democratic and capitalist … We cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from 
the present one, and at the same time better’” (emphasis in original).  
52 Ruth Levitas, “For Utopia: The (Limits of the) Utopian Function in Late Capitalist Society” (2000) 3(2-3) 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 25, 31 
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Douzinas, writing in 2000, suggests that in postmodern conditions “utopia can be defined as 
the remembrance of the future.”53 Louis Marin, writing in 1993, anticipates that perspective:  
At the end of a millennium … when singing out loud the end of the ideologies and the end 
of frontiers seems to be accomplished in a universal totality – when, in recent debates, there 
is confusedly and loudly forecast … the end of history … as the universal mode of high-
tech democratic hyperliberalism … – precisely at this moment it is worthwhile to recall the 
fiction of an island appearing at the dawn of a period for which the present time would be 
the twilight.54 
Echoing Bauman’s phrase – “happiness means now a different today rather than a more 
felicitous tomorrow, as it did in the past”55 – in these anti-utopian times what passes for 
utopianism is, Levitas maintains, often “pragmatic, limited reformism … essentially anti-
utopian in its rejection of radical utopian otherness or fundamental social transformation.”56 
I want to suggest that pragmatic, realist anti-utopianism dominates international legal thought 
in the form of various blueprints for a “different today.” My argument is that international legal 
thought and scholarship must re-situate its understanding of utopianism by replacing 
blueprintism with iconoclasm because if that does not happen international law, as a 
“degenerate utopia” (see the third part of this article) – a utopia that merely reforms, repackages 
and re-presents what is  will not even begin to be capable of grappling with the existential 
threat of climate change. Incapacity to engage with climate change is not, of course, the only 
basis on which international legal blueprintism can be critiqued and a more wide-ranging 
critique will be developed in what follows. But it is, as Kim Stanley Robinson suggests,57 the 
most compelling and decisive because it demonstrates the absolute, existential imperative of a 
future that does not continue to reproduce the present.  
If the contemporary, postmodern present is an order or system built on the supposed 
permanence of a commodified, consumerist reality, subordinating everything to processes of 
commodification and consumption and manifesting a “totalitarian desire for power” over past, 
present and future realities,58 utopia(nism) is a way of insisting on “the limits of any state, any 
institution.”59 For Louis Marin Utopia is “a displaced map displacing all maps and really 
finding none,”60 a “‘sign of the authentic end [that] opens into emptiness … [that] does not 
announce a new series … [but] leads out of the series … giv[ing] the signal that we are coming 
out of the series … that we are entering into the possible, the unfated … [or] at least into a fate 
that can be modified.’”61 Like Marin, critical theorist Theodor Adorno promotes resistance to 
any order or condition: “An order that shuts itself up in its own meaning will shut itself away 
                                                          
53 Douzinas (n 49) 226.  
54 Marin, “Frontiers” (n 46) 411-412.  
55 See Bauman quotation at n 26.  
56 Levitas (n 52) 31. 
57 See text at n 17 and n 18.  
58 Marin, “Frontiers” (n 46) 420.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid 417.  
61 Ibid 420 (quoting Ernst Bloch).  
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from the possibility above order.”62 I argue that the international legal order needs to discover 
and be open to “the possibility above” it. Rather than seeking to contain or repel challenges to 
its orderliness by insisting on its unity, coherence, and systematicity, challenges to international 
law's integrity need to be seen as moments of utopian possibility, chances for international law 
to embrace the possibility of a genuine future. Political philosopher Miguel Abensour captures 
something of this in his reflections on catastrophe and utopia: 
[F]rom catastrophe … arises a new utopian summation, the “never again” that immediately 
expresses, beyond the banality of the formulation, the exigency of utopia, as if catastrophe 
has a contrario revealed the necessity of utopia … The time of history is not homogeneous, 
empty material; it bears forever inscribed in it, despite forgetting, the wounds of the past, the 
trace of rupture.63  
“[R]upture” expresses the utopian possibility of each event or moment, its capacity to negate 
what is and open “order” up to “the possibility above” it. Cultural and literary critic Walter 
Benjamin recognises the potential of the singular moment as a break, rejecting the idea of 
history as a process of “establishing a causal nexus” – an order, a pattern – “among various 
moments of history” and the notion of a “homogeneous, empty time.”64 He prefers “a 
conception of the present as now-time shot through with the splinters of messianic time” and 
the notion that “every second was the small gateway in time through which the Messiah might 
enter.”65 In similar terms, Abensour argues that “once we have drunk from the cup of utopian 
displacement, any enclosure, any installation in a place would become inconceivable.”66 
Utopia, for Abensour, is defined by its “persistence,” “its very fluidity and plasticity,” its pursuit 
of “ephemeral but nevertheless interminable lines of flight that open breaches.”67    
In promoting an iconoclastic international legal utopianism, in place of the “blueprint” 
utopianism that I suggest currently dominates international legal thinking, I am arguing that 
Utopia, as a negative no-place (Ou-topia), is international law’s Eutopia (good place). The 
dialectical relationship between non-existence and good-ness, expressed in ideas of 
impossibility, imperative, negation, and neutralisation outlined above, offers “ephemeral ... 
interminable lines of flight” that international legal thought should, I suggest, follow. 
Part 2: Blueprints   
1   Being “Within”: Antonio Cassese, Martti Koskenniemi and The Utopian Possibility of 
International Law 
In the introduction to Realizing Utopia, his 2012 edited collection, Antonio Cassese considers 
three attitudes outlined by dystopian author Aldous Huxley.68 First, the attitude of “the 
                                                          
62 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Continuum, 2007 [1966]) 397.  
63 Abensour (n 20) 419.  
64 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” in Walter Benjamin (Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings 
eds.), Selected Writings: Volume 4 1938-1940 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006) 389, 397.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Abensour (n 20) 418.  
67 Ibid.  
68 See Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Chatto & Windus, 1932).  
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Technicians, who … are inclined ‘to accept too complacently the main framework of the 
structure whose details they are trying to improve’”; next, the attitude of “the Utopians, who 
‘are much too preoccupied with what ought to be to pay any serious attention to what is’”; and 
finally, the attitude of “the Judicious Reformers” who, according to Cassese, “[are] … alert to 
the present … suggest[ing] realistic and viable avenues in order to avoid, at least to some extent, 
those pitfalls encountered when trying to build a better path.” 69 Cassese prefers the outlook of 
the judicious reformer, presenting his “realistic utopia[nism]” as “miles away from the 
traditional conception of utopia,”70 and preferring “new avenues for improving the major 
deficiencies of the current society of states” to utopian ideals of “comity, friendship, and 
cooperation.”71 Presented in these terms, Cassese’s project is more concerned with reform than 
Utopia.  
Various “avenues” are pursued in the book’s forty-seven chapters  explorations of ‘global 
community’ such as Philip Alston’s proposals for UN reform or Anne Peters review of 
international legal constitutionalism,72 or normative reforms such as Nils Melzer’s proposal to 
“[bolster] the protection of civilians in armed conflict.”73 Walking down these “avenues” the 
judicious reformer “moves on the solid ground of ‘critical positivism’,”74 “engaging … in 
imaginative thinking” whilst “refrain[ing] from chasing unattainable dreams.”75  
In this determinedly realistic sense Cassese has a “belief in law as a means to realize Utopia,”76 
and he seems to share that belief with his contributors. Martti Koskenniemi, for example, 
suggests that as a “realistic utopia … that begin[s] with the critique of present institutions” 
international law sustains the possibility of “invit[ing] the widest possible participation by 
everyone, but especially those in the global South,”77 encouraging a Kantian utopianism of 
“critique and contestation” that “start[s] from here and now … judg[ing] present institutions in 
view of the maximization of freedom tomorrow.”78 Most of Cassese’s contributors prefer a 
more practical-doctrinal concept of utopia, however, focussing on institutional or normative 
reforms – consider Bardo Fassbender’s proposal for a Security Council that “attaches more 
importance to collective goods and interests of all peoples inhabiting the earth than to the 
individual goods and interests of the states represented in the Council,”79 or Jérome de 
                                                          
69 Cassese, “Introduction” (n.9) xvii-xviii (quoting Huxley).  
70 Ibid xviii and xxi.  
71 Ibid. xxi.  
72 Philip Alston, “The United Nations: No Hope for Reform?” in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The 
Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 38; Anne Peters, “Are we Moving towards 
Constitutionalization of the World Community?” in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 118.  
73 Nils Melzer, “Bolstering the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing 
Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 508.  
74 Cassese, “Introduction” (n 9) xvii.  
75 Ibid, xxi, xxii.  
76 Isabel Feichtner, “Realizing Utopia through the Practice of International Law” (2012) 23 European Journal of 
International Law 1143, 1144.  
77 Martti Koskenniemi, “Utopia as Critique” in Antonio Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 3, 12.  
78 Ibid, 13, 12.  
79 Bardo Fassbender, “The Security Council: Progress is Possible but Unlikely” in Antonio Cassese (ed.), 
Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 52, 58 
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Hemptinne’s “Blueprint for Action” on “The Future of International Criminal Justice.”80 
Anxieties about realism – about connections with and plausibility in the context of what is – 
mean that this is not a project in search of Utopia but a limited “blueprint” for a reformed legal 
future.   
Cassese is not the first international lawyer to attempt a balancing act between Utopia and 
realism. Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia charts the opposition between the 
“concrete” reality of an international law made by states and a strongly “normative” 
international law built on conceptions of ‘the good’:81  
A law which would lack distance from State behaviour will or interest would amount to a 
non-normative apology, a mere sociological description. A law which would base itself on 
principles which are unrelated to State behaviour, will or interest would seem utopian, 
incapable of demonstrating its own content in any reliable way.82 
Koskenniemi offers no solution to the oscillation between concreteness (reality) and 
normativity (utopia) because, on his analysis, international law is defined by “the dynamics of 
[this] contradiction.”83 Whilst Koskenniemi’s approach identifies qualifiedly utopian 
possibilities within the existing international legal structure, Cassese advocates realistically 
utopian reforms to that structure. Both define their utopianism by reference to the realities of 
contemporary international law, tacitly rejecting approaches that would pursue a non-existent 
no-place (Ou-topia) or an unqualifiedly good place (Eutopia).  
Opportunities for the kind of “critique and contestation” that Koskenniemi advocates are to be 
found in gaps or indeterminacies in international legal discourse.84 International legal 
indeterminacy originates in the opposition between concreteness and normativity,85 in the 
possibility of basing legal arguments on either normative goals or the concretely expressed will 
of states.86 The inherent nature of that indeterminacy – the impossibility of resolving it by 
preferring either  normativity or concreteness – leads Koskenniemi to conclude that “law is 
incapable of providing convincing justifications to the solution of normative problems.”87 This 
                                                          
80 Jérome de Hemptinne, “The Future of International Criminal Justice: A Blueprint for Action” in Antonio 
Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 585.  
81 Koskenniemi, From Apology (n 10) 58: “The requirement of concreteness related to the need to verify the law’s 
content not against some political principles but by reference to the concrete behaviour, will and interest of States. 
The requirement of normativity related to the capacity of the law to be opposable to State policy … A doctrine 
with much concreteness seemed to lose its normative nature and end up in descriptive apology. A truly normative 
doctrine created a gap between itself and State practice in a manner which made doubtful the objectivity of the 
method of verifying its norms. It ended up in undemonstrable utopias.” I develop a more comprehensive analysis 
of Koskenniemi’s oeuvre – the analysis here being limited to Koskenniemi’s engagement with utopia – in Matthew 
Nicholson, “Psychoanalyzing International Law(yers)” (2017) 18(3) German Law Journal 441. 
82 Koskenniemi, From Apology (n 10) 17 
83 Ibid 58. See also ibid 65: “[D]octrine is forced to maintain itself in constant movement from emphasizing 
concreteness to emphasizing normativity and vice-versa without being able to establish itself permanently in either 
position” (emphasis in original).  
84 “critique and contestation” – see Koskenniemi quotation at n 78.  
85 See Koskenniemi, From Apology (n 10) 28-58 and 590-596 on indeterminacy.   
86 Ibid 63: “International legal discourse is incoherent as it incorporates contradictory assumptions about what it 
is to argue objectively about norms. This gives rise to conflicting legal arguments and the inability to prefer any 
of them” (emphasis in original).  
87 Ibid 69. 
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indeterminacy means that international lawyers have to make choices that are not dictated by 
the law’s content or structure.88 In making such choices international lawyers practice 
hegemony. Hegemony is a particular form of decision-making in circumstances of socio-
political incoherence where the supposedly governing texts do not dictate the outcome.89 The 
practice of international legal hegemony expresses the “realistic utopia” of “critique and 
contestation” that Koskenniemi contemplates in his contribution to Cassese’s edited 
collection,90 reflecting the possibility of achieving limited yet positive change within 
international law’s structure.  
Koskenniemi characterises his approach as “more [of] … a critical standpoint from which to 
attack any present (functional) architecture for falling short of the ideal of freedom than a 
constructive platform on which to impose any particular blueprint on the world.”91 Whilst he 
does not offer a detailed, ‘build-to-print’ utopian plan, Koskenniemi sketches a utopian 
blueprint: an image of international law as a frame within which Utopia might be built. That 
frame consists of formal political equality – “the widest possible participation by everyone, but 
especially those in the global South”;92 a vague notion of freedom – “judge present institutions 
in view of the maximization of freedom tomorrow”;93 and an image of extant international law 
as a Utopia of sorts – a good place / no-place that affords something unavailable in the non-
legal, ‘real’ world:  
In the absence of agreement over, or knowledge of the “true” objectives of political 
community – that is to say, in an agnostic world – the pure form of international law provides 
the shared surface – the only such surface – on which political adversaries recognize each 
other as such and pursue their adversity in terms of something shared, instead of seeking to 
attain full exclusion – “outlawry” – of the other. In this sense, international law’s value and 
its misery lie in its being the fragile surface of political community among social agents – 
States, other communities, individuals – who disagree about their preferences but do this 
within a structure that invites them to argue in terms of an assumed universality.94  
Cassese and Koskenniemi “[shut international law] up in its own [extant] meaning … away 
from the possibilit[ies] above [the extant international legal] order” by focussing on the limited 
                                                          
88 See ibid 69: “I believe that lawyers should admit that if they wish to achieve justifications, they have to take a 
stand on political issues without assuming that there exists a privileged rationality which solves such issues for 
them.” See also ibid 536: “[L]awyers expectations of certainty should be downgraded … they – as well as States 
and statesmen – must take seriously the moral-political choices they are faced with when arguing ‘within the law’ 
and accept the consequence that in some relevant sense the choices are theirs and that they therefore should be 
responsible for them.” 
89 See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (2nd edition, Verso, 2001). For a detailed exploration of the links between Koskenniemi’s and Laclau’s 
and Mouffe’s work, and the centrality of hegemony to Koskenniemi’s international legal theory, see Nicholson, 
“Psychoanalyzing” (n 81).   
90 “critique and contestation” – see Koskenniemi quotation at n 78.  
91 Koskenniemi, “Utopia as Critique” (n 77) 12.  
92 Ibid (also quoted at n 77 above).   
93 Ibid.  
94 Martti Koskenniemi, “What is International Law For?” in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (4th 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2014) 29, 48 (emphasis – “only” – in third line of quotation in original; emphasis 
– “within” – in final line added).  
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utopian possibilities within existing international law.95 As outlined in the part one, I argue that 
this is the wrong choice and that it is now vital to investigate the “possibility above [the extant 
international legal] order.”96 That argument is, of course, not fully developed at this point; that 
will have to wait until the last part of this article. But in this section I have sought to demonstrate 
that Cassese and Koskenniemi – perhaps the best known international legal utopians in the 
literature  quite deliberately fit their utopian ambitions into extant international law, remaining 
“trapped and confined” within “the system” as a result.97  
Akbar Rasulov, in perhaps the most recent reflection on international legal utopianism in the 
literature, prefers investment in the extant international legal system to international legal 
utopianism.98 For Rasulov “the single greatest favour one could ever render to the idea of 
international legal utopianism is to relieve it of any great theoretical duties.”99 Rasulov prefers 
“study [of] the practical givens of law’s social reality” to utopian projects that seek to re-make 
international law,100 largely because international law, with its goal of “a single worldwide 
regime of the rule of law,”101 is and always has been utopian. Consistent with Cassese’s and 
Koskenniemi’s approach Rasulov invests in such utopianism as exists within international law, 
excluding the “possibility above [the extant international legal] order” that the argument 
advanced here invests in.102 
2   Fragments of a Legal Utopia  
Consistent with Cassese’s and Koskenniemi’s ‘within’-ness, a number of voices argue that there 
are aspects or fragments of utopia – limited legal blueprints for a slightly improved future – 
within international law.  
Writing in 1985, Alexandre Kiss suggests a certain utopianism in the “common heritage of 
mankind” regimes in the Antarctic Treaty, the international legal framework governing 
activities on the moon, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s framework 
governing ‘the Area’103  ‘the Area’ being “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
                                                          
95 Adorno, Negative Dialectics (n 62) 397 (also quoted at n 62).  
96 See text at n 62 to n 63.  
97 “trapped and confined” and “the system” – see Jameson quotation at n 7 above.  
98 Akbar Rasulov, “The Utopians” in Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: 
Contributions to Disciplinary Thought (Edward Elgar 2019) 879. See ibid 899: “There is no theoretical value – 
nor, indeed, should there be any political reason – in continuing any form of investment, discursive or otherwise, 
in that synthetic abstraction … the utopian international lawyer as a (purported) disciplinary ideal type. Let the 
empty chimeras stay where they belong – outside our system of operative analytical categories.” 
99 Ibid 898-899.  
100 Ibid 898.  
101 Ibid 897: “[I]f the ultimate hallmark of the utopian approach is that its proponents always tend to go off on a 
quest for some non-existent unicorn, to grab for the future instead of working for it patiently in the present, to 
fantasize impotently and to fall ill with longing, then the ultimate question that ought to confront every 
international lawyer at this point, surely, must be: has there ever been an enterprise that was more utopian – more 
hubristic, more delusional, a product of greater infantilism and a false sense of confidence – than the very project 
of modern international law itself, with its naïve plans to replace the ‘political’ with the ‘international’, to bring 
into existence a single worldwide regime of the rule of law without creating a corresponding system of 
enforcement institutions, a global legal order without a world government?” (emphasis in original).  
102 See text at n 62 to n 63.  
103 Alexandre Kiss, “The common heritage of mankind: utopia or reality?” (1985) 40(3) International Journal 
423; Antarctic Treaty, 402 UNTS 71 (no. 5778), as discussed by Kiss, ibid, at 428; Agreement Governing the 
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beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.104 The idea that by operation of law the Antarctic, 
the moon, and ‘the Area’ are placed beyond exclusionary claims of national ownership certainly 
has a utopian quality in the context of contemporary processes of commodification and 
consumption. But Kiss is pessimistic about the prospects of realising this “common heritage” 
Utopia, noting that enforcement of these normative frameworks cannot be guaranteed given the 
absence of compulsory jurisdiction over states for international courts.105  
Richard Falk, in a 1964 article about “the condition of international legal theory in the United 
States,”106 recommends “a discouraging realism and a qualified commitment to utopian 
objectives” in view of the “tragic paradox” that “effective management of violence in world 
affairs” is a “necessity” whilst “achieving management by consensual means” is 
“impossible.”107 Falk’s qualified utopianism informs his assessment of the UN Charter’s 
collective security regime: “[C]ompared to the League [of Nations], the United Nations 
constitutes a more ambitious attempt to create a visible institutional center for international 
society competent, if not capable, to restrain recourse to violence by nations.”108 Falk is in 
search of blueprints, more interested in plans or “techniques for getting from here to there than 
[in] … a vision of what it will be like when we get there.”109 Whilst the UN Charter is not a 
utopian blueprint, there are faint outlines of a better future, “a model … a helpful guide.”110 
The utopian dimension of the jus ad bellum suggested by Falk is widely recognised in the 
literature. Writing in the pre-Charter days of 1943 Georg Schwarzenberger, for example, notes 
that perspectives differ as “the emphasis changes from war as the natural state of relations 
between States to peace as ‘a state most highly agreeable to human nature.’”111 If “[r]eality and 
utopia often are amalgamated in the picture of the state of nature” then Utopia is one component 
in “a sociological analysis of international law … as an ideology, reality and utopia.”112 
Marc Weller, writing in 2018, goes beyond Falk’s and Schwarzenberger’s cautious utopianism, 
concluding that “the legal system on the use of force … is principally utopian in character, both 
in terms of its substantive rules and its process requirements.”113 For Weller “utopia is not an 
‘un-place’” because “[t]he League Covenant and its successor, the UN Charter, reflect all the 
major elements that would ordinarily be characterised as utopian when put forward as a 
                                                          
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS 305 (no. 8843), as discussed by Kiss, 
ibid, at 431; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), 1833 UNTS 3 (no. 31363), as 
discussed by Kiss, ibid, at 431-433. 
104 UNCLOS, ibid, Art. 1.  
105 Kiss (n 103) 440. 
106 Richard Falk, “The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of international Law – Gaps in Legal Thinking” 
(1964) 50(2) Virginia Law Review 231, 231.  
107 Ibid 247-248 (parts of the original text are in italics).  
108 Ibid 246.  
109 Ibid 249.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Georg Schwarzenberger, “Jus Pacis Ac Belli?: Prolegomena to a Sociology of International Law” (1943) 37(3) 
American Journal of International Law 460, 460 (quoting Pufendorf).  
112 Ibid 460, 479.  
113 Marc Weller, “The Real Utopia: International Constitutionalism and The Use of Force” in Robert Schütze 
(ed.), Globalization and Governance: International Problems, European Solutions (Cambridge University Press, 
2018) 131, 146.  
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programmatic proposal.”114 Weller goes so far as to suggest that through the law on the use of 
force “the international legal system has developed beyond Utopia, in ways Sir Thomas More 
and his successors would have found difficult to imagine, or perhaps even to endorse.”115 All 
that remains, according to Weller, is for this utopian legal framework to become “fully 
effective.”116  
Balancing latent utopian potential with a failure to match that potential in implementation – a 
familiar theme in much of the international legal analysis considered so far, with the notable 
exception of Weller – Costas Douzinas laments the “conformism which threatens human rights 
when they become a tool of states, governments and international organisations.”117 Douzinas 
maintains some hope for Utopia as “the name for the great power of imagination which finds 
the future latent in every cultural product … preserv[ing] the kernel of radical enthusiasm in 
every ideology it criticises.”118  
Some see utopian potential in the concept of a universal jurisdiction, permitting all national 
courts to try international crimes regardless of the nationality of the accused or connection 
between the offence and the forum state. Lisa Hajjar welcomes the chaos in inter-state relations 
that such universal jurisdiction would cause,119 whilst Fannie Lafontaine describes universal 
jurisdiction as “the realistic utopia.”120 Darryl Robinson uses Koskenniemi’s apology-utopia 
dialectic to review criticisms of the International Criminal Court.121 Noting that the court is 
critiqued for being too close to the whims of states (apology) and for being too detached from 
the realities of inter-state relations (utopia),122 Robinson concludes that “the impossibility of 
the [international criminal law] project need not undermine its necessity.”123 
Across the literature, from Cassese’s realism, via Koskenniemi’s structuralism, to Robinson’s 
reflections on international criminal law, there is a determination to find and invest in extant 
international law’s (limited) Utopia. Philip Allott inverts that approach, rejecting the pursuit of 
the utopian within existing international law as the first step in re-forming international law and 
building a global, utopian society.  
3   On the Outside: Phillip Allott’s Eutopianism 
                                                          
114 Ibid 137.  
115 Ibid 146.  
116 Ibid 147.  
117 Douzinas, (n 49) 226.  
118 Ibid 224.  
119 Lisa Hajjar, “Chaos as Utopia: International Criminal Prosecutions as a Challenge to State Power” (2004) 31 
Studies in Law, Politics and Society 3, 9, extolling “the political productivity of legal violence to attack impunity 
by making the powerful vulnerable, and [the] value of chaos made possible by the threat legal violence poses to 
public officials responsible for gross violations.”  
120 Fannie Lafontaine, “Universal Jurisdiction – the Realistic Utopia” (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 1277.  
121 Darryl Robinson, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the International Criminal Court Cannot Win” (2015) 28 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 323. On Koskenniemi’s apology-utopia dialectic see text at n 82. 
122 Robinson ibid 325-326.  
123 Ibid, 347.  
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Philip Allott works from outside extant international law, challenging it to become more than 
it is or has been.124 In Eunomia, first published in 1990, Allott “seeks to invoke the power of 
the future to re-imagine the human world by proposing a new ideal of international society, the 
society of all-humanity, the society of all societies.”125 The law of this meta-society is, on 
Allott’s analysis, “an emerging universal legal system, the legal system of all legal systems,”126 
arising out of post-Cold War processes of globalization and associated changes in the way 
people think and live.127  
 
Allott contrasts “old international law” – “typically the law acknowledged by governments and 
their advisers and consecrated by the International Court of Justice in The Hague” – with a 
“new international law … made in countless international forums, implemented through 
countless international agencies, interpreted and applied by countless new international courts 
and tribunals … re-enacted by national legislatures, implemented by national executive 
branches of government, [and] enforced in national courts.”128 Reflecting on his experience as 
a legal adviser in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, he critiques the sense in which 
“[t]he masters of the world of tomorrow are the slaves of yesterday’s ideas,”129 noting that “the 
international system itself is nothing other than a structure of ideas.”130 “[W]ithdrawing to the 
cloisters of Cambridge in 1973,”131 Allott describes his attempt to “understand and then to 
change the systematic structure of international society” in light of his Foreign Office 
experience,132 having resolved “to create a new total view of society and law”:133 
 
[T]he task always a practical one – to form a view which could become the normal content 
of consciousness of all those involved, closely or distantly, in national government and in 
international society, eventually replacing the existing theoretical structures completely.134  
This, then, is ideational blueprint utopianism: a practical project that seeks to change the 
“consciousness” of all relevant actors. Allott asserts the distinctive law-ness of international 
law and the necessity of its connection with social reality, valuing Hans Kelsen’s work because 
it “grounded legal obligation in the coherence of a closed system of obligation,”135 whilst 
praising Myres McDougal’s effort to “integrate the conceptualizing of international society and 
law into the conceptualizing of social process in general.”136 He sets himself the task of 
                                                          
124 See Anthony Carty, “Social Theory and the ‘Vanishing’ of International Law: A Review Article” (1992) 41 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 939, 939, commenting on Allott’s Eunomia: “the discipline 
[international law] is subsumed under much wider categories … [Allott] appear[s] to ignore the form-content or 
procedure-substance distinction in international law”; 940: “Allott presents himself as an outsider” (emphasis in 
original).  
125 Allott, Eunomia (n 11) xxvi.  
126 Ibid xxv 
127 Ibid xiii-xxiv.  
128 Ibid xv.  
129 Ibid xlv. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid xlvi.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid xlvii.  
136 Ibid xlvii.  
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“providing, in the spirit of Kelsen, a basis of philosophical coherence for international society 
and law [whilst] … integrating, in the spirit of McDougal, the international social process into 
social process more generally.”137 
Eunomia is written in a didactic, utopian tone and style. It is not an analytical study of thought 
and scholarship on the nature, theory and history of international law but a utopian blueprint 
for the “new international law.” Allott declares “[t]he task of humanity now is to take possession 
of the waste-land of international society in the name of the people and in the name of justice 
… redeem[ing] state-societies as systems for organizing the willing and acting of all human 
beings.”138 Eunomia includes three utopian draft treaties, each one invoking “We, the 
people”:139 “Treaty on the Constituting of International Society” (declaring “[i]international 
law [to be] … the law of international society embodying the common interest of all 
humanity”);140 “Treaty on the Elimination of War” (“We undertake to do everything possible 
to eliminate the practice of war”);141 and “Treaty on the Elimination of Force in International 
Society” (“We undertake not to preach, teach, or otherwise propagate the idea that the use of 
force in international society is, or may be, politically or morally or legally justifiable, either in 
general or in particular situations”).142  
 
Allott’s concept of law is grounded in the deliberative, democratic participation of individuals, 
reflecting a classical public-ness that underpins the draft treaties:  
 
In generating the pure theory which contains the idea and the ideal of democracy, a society 
seeks the means to enable the people, the members of society, to embrace law as their own, 
not merely because they may conceive of themselves as its authorizing source but because 
they may will and act the law in their participation in the total social process which forms 
it.143  
 
Allott’s utopian plan is for all individuals to participate in the “self-creating of the people of the 
world through their own willing,”144 bringing about “a self-willed change in human 
consciousness. A revolution, not in the streets but in the mind.”145 He describes this as “a 
practical theory of social idealism,”146 insisting that “social idealism … must become the basis 
for a new international law which humanity will construct as the law of a new international 
society.”147 Acknowledging that some regard Eunomia as “utopian, a dream rather than a 
prediction” because “it failed to specify the practical steps, especially the institutional changes, 
                                                          
137 Ibid xlviii.  
138 Ibid 254 (paragraph 14.1) 
139 See opening lines of the three draft treaties at ibid xxxv, xxxvii, and xxxviii.  
140 Ibid xxxv-xxxvii (quotation in brackets from Article 2 at xxxv).  
141 Ibid xxxvii-xxxviii (quotation in brackets from Article 2 at xxxvii).  
142 Ibid xxxviii-xl (quotation in brackets from Article 3 at xxxix).  
143 Ibid 256 (paragraph 14.7).  
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid 257 (paragraph 14.9).  
146 Ibid 410 (paragraph 19.25 – parts of the original text are in italics).  
147 Ibid 410-411 (paragraph 19.25 – parts of the original text are in italics).  
18 
 
which would allow us to get … from the actual to the ideal,”148 Allott insists that “[w]hat we 
have made by thinking we can make new by new thinking.”149 
 
Allott’s focus on thought excludes consideration of material circumstances, analysis of extant 
legal, social, political or economic structures, and historical inquiry. He offers various 
characterisations of what history is or its function in the ideational recreation of the world – 
“history is the past studying the past,”150 “[h]istory is … the story of a past and a future which 
are themselves a present-here-and-now,”151 “[h]istory must be seen as the gradual actualizing 
of the potentiality of some original or pre-historical or putative society”152 – without actually 
engaging with the detail of material history. This absence suggests that Allott’s social idealism 
operates in a temporal vacuum, outside history and the passage of time.153 
 
Compounding this sense of detachment from what is and what was, Eunomia offers 
unsupported statements and verdicts in lieu of analysis of extant international law: 
“International law has been neither very threatening nor very useful to the politicians and the 
diplomats”;154 “The legal relations of international law were and are essentially the legal 
relations necessary to temper the public interactive willing and acting of the governments of 
statal societies as that willing and acting affects their sovereignty over territory.”155 No 
references to or quotations from literature are offered to support these claims – indeed, Eunomia 
contains no footnotes and no bibliography. This is more than a formal or presentational point.  
The absence of footnotes and a bibliography are, I suggest, a product of Allott’s idealistic, 
blueprint utopianism. The argument for “self-creating” through thought does not,156 for Allott, 
need to be situated in or connected to the world, to literature, or with the detail of what has been 
thought, what is being thought, or what is happening. Save for some prefatory reflections on 
globalisation, the professional experience of its author and the post-Cold War global 
situation,157 Eunomia contains very little about time, place or lived experience, suggesting that 
such concerns do not arise when the world is viewed from “the cloisters of Cambridge.”158 
 
Eunomia’s emphasis on thought and idealism and its exclusion of material and temporal 
concerns permeate Allott’s other work.159  He insists that “[s]ociety is made in the mind,”160 
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that “[l]aw is a special way in which society thinks,”161 and that “the ideal … enables the human 
mind and human societies to imagine a better future and to choose to enact a better future.”162 
Allott’s entire approach is defined by an insistence on the human-ness of reality: “Human 
beings inhabit a human world, entirely made by the human mind, a world parallel to the natural 
world, a self-made second human habitat, a human mind-world with its own human reality.”163  
 
There is, I suggest, a seamless connection between the didactic-idealist utopianism that drives 
Allott’s work, the casual treatment of relevant theories and literature, and the absence of any 
substantive concern with time, place and lived experience. All are the product of an evangelical 
focus on the human-ness of reality, on human thought as the determinant of what is, what was, 
and what will be.164 This suggests a return to the Enlightenment ideal of human thought as the 
supreme power, something Allott hints at in observing that “Eunomia and Eutopia simply 
ignore the End of Philosophy proclaimed in the twentieth century.”165  
 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno critique the idealist assumption of human power over 
reality and nature in Dialectic of Enlightenment, defining the aims of the Enlightenment in 
terms that resonate with Allott’s project: “The program of the Enlightenment was the 
disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for 
fancy.”166 The Enlightenment, for Horkheimer and Adorno, created a social, political and 
cultural situation in which “[w]ithout regard to distinctions, the world becomes subject to 
man”:167 “Man’s likeness to God consists in sovereignty over existence, in the countenance of 
the law and master and in command.”168 By proudly “ignor[ing] the End of Philosophy” – and 
by “the End of philosophy” Allott seems to mean critical, post-Enlightenment, philosophy of 
the kind in which Horkheimer and Adorno engage – Allott seeks to wall his project off from 
critical thinking that contests the totalising supremacy of the human mind. It is difficult to 
understand why Allott, as a scholar writing in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, 
would imagine he can “simply ignore” the development of post-Enlightenment philosophy.  
 
On Horkheimer and Adorno’s interpretation Francis Bacon, to whom Allott refers,169 advocates 
a “patriarchal” state of “concordance between the mind and man and the nature of things” in 
which “the human mind … overcomes superstition [and] … hold[s] sway over a disenchanted 
nature.”170 This “concordance” means that “[k]nowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles: 
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neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance with the world’s rulers.”171 Such totalising 
knowledge originates in a fear of the unknown:  
 
Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown … 
Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical … Nothing at all may remain outside, because 
the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear.172  
 
Human dominance over nature and reality naturalises itself over time: “The more the machinery 
of thought subjects existence to itself, the more blind its resignation in reproducing existence. 
Hence enlightenment returns to mythology, which it never really knew how to elude.”173 The 
prevailing logic is one of domination as “men [sic.] distance themselves from nature in order 
thus imaginatively to present it to themselves – but only in order to determine how it is to be 
dominated.”174  
 
Allott’s attachment to the Enlightenment values of knowledge and rationality critiqued by 
Horkheimer and Adorno is again on display in Eutopia. Published in 2016 as something like a 
sequel to Eunomia, Allott describes the book as “designed to bring the great and ancient 
existential human debate back to life, before it is too late.”175 Invoking Thomas More’s Utopia 
and Francis Bacon – in particular Bacon’s insistence that “a revolution in our understanding of 
the human mind could produce every other kind of revolution”176 – the book’s foreword closes 
with a quotation from More: “Deservedly ought I to be called by the name of Eutopia or Happy 
Land.”177  
 
Eutopia claims to offer a “road from Isotpia to Eutopia – from where we are to where we want 
to be – pass[ing] through Knowtopia.”178 Knowtopia is “the place where we learn about the 
extraordinary powers of the human mind, the private mind and the public mind, and where we 
take stock of the human condition … the bright face and the dark face of human history … our 
present troubled situation and our perilous future.”179 In a didactic-idealist tone familiar from 
Eunomia, Allott claims that in Eutopia “[w]e have learned that, over the course of millennia 
and in countless different cultures, the human mind and the human will have been wonderfully 
creative and ingenious and bold in responding to an unceasing succession of challenges.”180  
 
Allott is unwilling to allow the reader to formulate her own response to the text, preferring to 
tell us what “[w]e have learned.”181 This desire to control the readership is also apparent in 
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passages unsupported by reasoning and lacking any attempt at persuasion. Consider, for 
example, this passage on the function of art:  
 
Bad art and popular culture give pleasure to many people, and they make money for those 
who create and manage and sell them. That is justification enough for bad art and popular 
culture. And popular culture can sometimes rise to the level of high art.182  
 
Employing a similar approach, Allott notes (in a chapter entitled “Paradoxes of Being Human 
II”) that “[t]here is no agreement among biologists and ethnologists as to the general ‘nature’ 
of our animal ancestors and hence no agreement as to the instincts that we have inherited.”183 
No details on the biological and ethnological literature consulted in formulating this view are 
offered, and this lack of support and reasoning recurs throughout the text – see, for example, 
the assertion that “[w]hat people most want is to be left in command of a private space in which 
they and their family can flourish, within a public space designed to deliver, and actually 
delivering the best possible conditions for personal flourishing.”184 No empirical support for 
this assertion is offered, nor does Allott justify his preference for a liberal-capitalist “command 
of a private space” model over more communal, collectivist forms of living.  
 
Eutopia, like Eunomia, has neither footnotes nor bibliography. Instead, each chapter is followed 
by a list of “other voices”  that is, voices other than Allott’s  including Shakespeare, 
Rousseau, Machiavelli, Thomas More, Hegel, Nietzsche, Alexander Pope, Einstein, Wikipedia, 
Freud, Marx, and Kant. Whilst some non-European “other voices” are included – a quotation 
from Hsun Ch’ing,185 a reference to Franz Fanon186 – there is a strong bias towards modern or 
pre-modern socio-political theory and philosophy written by European men. Allott could have 
recognised and engaged with the voices and perspectives of others in his text, highlighting 
sources or influences on his thinking, but he prefers to position “other voices” in lists of 
quotations that the reader comes to only after reading his text, granting his voice primacy.  
 
Allott’s assertive, even domineering mode of authorship, serves as a means of effecting “[a 
utopian] revolution … in the mind” of the reader.187 This contrasts with more collaborative 
understandings of the relationship between author and reader, such as that outlined by Walter 
Benjamin in “The Author as Producer.”188 Benjamin advocates an authorial style in which “the 
reader is at all times ready to become a writer – that is, a describer, or even a prescriber.”189 
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Authors must “never … merely work on products but always, at the same time, work on the 
means of production.”190 This “Umfunktionierung” or “functional transformation” in the 
production of text means that “the conventional distinction between author and the public … 
begins … to disappear.”191 The point of writing, for Benjamin, is “to induce other producers to 
produce” and “to put an improved apparatus at their disposal.”192 The “apparatus” will be 
“better, the more consumers it is able to turn into producers – that is, readers or spectators into 
collaborators.”193 In promoting “Umfunktionierung” Benjamin critiques the alternative 
perspective of “Activism” whose “demands are summed up … in plain language” as “‘rule of 
the mind’” or “‘rule of the intellectuals.’”194 According to Benjamin the activist “intellectual” 
is “a type of person defined by his opinions, attitudes or dispositions, but not by his position in 
the process of production.”195 Whilst the activist intellectual writes “political manifestos” the 
practitioner of Umfunktionierung “eliminate[s] the antithesis … between performers and 
listeners.”196  
 
Allott’s didactic style positions him as very much the “performer” and he consistently tells his 
reader or “listener” what is, what ought to be, and what the reader ought to think,197 claiming 
the capacity to define the human experience of reality,198 and even “[t]he task of humanity.”199 
He speaks for his readership, for “we” and of “us,”200 denying the reader the space to form her 
own views as she reads. This is not “Umfunktionierung,” not an exchange between author and 
reader that generates productive capacity in its readership, but a controlling and unpersuasive 
process of blunt, authoritarian instruction.201  
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This style of blueprint utopianism has been critiqued for its tendency towards messianism and 
totalitarianism. Russell Jacoby traces this critique back to Thomas More’s original Utopia, 
written in 1515 and 1516.202 Tracking the development of More’s life and work in England, 
from apparently advocating freedom of religion and conscience in Utopia, to “hunt[ing] and 
pursu[ing] Protestants and heretics” and banning books,203 Jacoby rejects Jasper Ridley’s 
charge that More became “‘a fanatic determined to crush what he considers to be the forces of 
evil’” on the basis that “[Ridley] uses twentieth-century categories to damn More.”204 Whatever 
the merits of Ridley’s charge, there is a troubling connection between More’s absolutism and 
Allott’s absolute confidence in human-ness and human thought.  
 
Jacoby’s analysis of anti-utopianism extends, beyond critiques of More, to Karl Popper’s 
work.205 Popper critiques the view that “rational political action must be based upon a more or 
less clear and detailed description or blueprint of our ideal state, and also upon a plan or 
blueprint of the historical path that leads towards this goal.”206 For Popper such blueprint 
utopianism is “an all too attractive theory … [that is] dangerous … pernicious … [and] self-
defeating, and it leads to violence.”207 For Popper there is no way to determine the “ideal state” 
through argumentation, reasoning, or science,208 so arguments about the ideal state “will at least 
partly have the character of religious differences.”209 To achieve his preferred ideal state:  
 
the Utopianist must win over, or else crush … competitors who do not share his own Utopian 
aims … He has to be very thorough in eliminating and stamping out all heretical competing 
views … [T]he rationality of his political action demands constancy of aim for a long time 
ahead; and this can only be achieved if he not merely crushes competing Utopian religions, 
but as far as possible stamps out all memory of them.210  
 
On this basis “Utopian rationalism …. [h]owever benevolent its ends … does not bring 
happiness, but only the familiar misery of being condemned to live under a tyrannical 
government.”211 Isaiah Berlin is similarly opposed to radical means. According to Jacoby, 
“Berlin ratifies an inherent and irreducible pluralism that gives the lie to any utopian 
theorizing,”212 opposing ambitious plans on the basis that “[w]e should be wary of ‘drastic 
action, in personal life or in public policy’ … since they may lead to unanticipated suffering.”213  
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Hannah Arendt is the last in Jacoby’s group of ‘liberal anti-utopians.’214 Jacoby highlights the 
proximity between Popper’s and Arendt’s positions, noting Arendt’s observation that “[t]he 
aggressiveness of totalitarianism springs not from the lust for power … nor for profit, but only 
for ideological reasons: to make the world consistent, to prove that its respective supersense has 
been right.”215 Arendt’s, Berlin’s and Popper’s perspectives are connected by their fear of 
totalisation. Allott’s work simply ignores that well-founded fear, concealing the link between 
utopianism, totalisation / totalitarianism behind superficially appealing calls for the constitution 
of a truly inter-national society.216  
 
Susan Marks’ analysis of “false contingency” offers a corrective to the superficiality of Allott’s 
idealistic utopianism, insisting that “[w]hile current arrangements can indeed be changed, 
change unfolds within a context that includes systemic constraints and pressures.”217 Marks 
explains that she wants to “re-evoke … the idea that things can be, and quite frequently are, 
contingent without being random, accidental, or arbitrary,”218 “us[ing] the term ‘false 
contingency’ to denote the failure to take that idea adequately into account.”219 Marks does not 
consider Allott’s work in her treatment of international legal “false contingency,” but Allott 
does seem to treat “the injustices of the present order … as though they were random, accidental 
and arbitrary,”220 as though they can simply be thought away.  
 
My critique of Koskenniemi’s and Cassese’s brand of blueprint utopianism was that they are 
hidebound by an emphasis on what is that excludes the possibility of what might be and, as a 
consequence, altogether too much “within” existing international law. My critique of Allott’s 
ideational blueprint utopianism is that it operates too much ‘outside’ extant international law, 
material reality and history. For a scholar so attached to Enlightenment ideals,221 Allott’s work 
is surprisingly postmodern. Consistent with what Jameson sees as a postmodern “crisis in 
historicity,”222 Allott casts material reality and history aside in order to sell his utopian vision 
of the human-ness of reality in a process of “absolute self-reproduction”223  that is, his own 
“self-reproduction.” Allott sells his view of “a human mind-world with its own human 
reality,”224 as seen “from the cloisters of Cambridge,”225 via a didactic tone and an attempt to 
control his audience. References and history and literature would only get in the way when the 
objective is aesthetic appeal to present-day audiences via numbered paragraphs (all of 
Eunomia’s and Eutopia’s paragraphs are numbered).226  
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Allott’s “human reality” treats all reality, past, present and future, as a postmodern commodity 
for humans to consume as they re-order global society, locking international law into the 
“eternal present” of a postmodernity in which commodification and consumption rule.227 If the 
lesson of climate change is that humans are only too capable of commodifying and consuming 
then, if international law is to have any hope of addressing climate change, the absolute 
commodification of reality entailed by Allott’s Eutopianism must be confined to its home in 
Cambridge.  
 
4   Samuel Moyn's Blueprint for Human Rights 
Across three books,228 and in one collection of essays,229 Samuel Moyn argues that 
“international human rights … should find a better compromise between utopianism and 
realism than has thus far been realized,”230 insisting that “if the human rights movement does 
not offer a more realistic and politicized utopia, something else will take its place.”231 Moyn 
argues that human rights “need to descend into the programmatic contest for power” and 
“become more scientific” because “a politics of human rights … should engage in the 
programmatic concern with designing good states, for the sake of global economic welfare.”232 
Moyn flirts with iconoclastic utopianism, via a “return to the utopian imagination in its pure 
form, divorced from attempts to institutionalize it,”233 contemplating the idea that we should 
“proceed from the refusal to pay reality the respect of conforming to it.”234 The flirtation is 
short-lived, however, and Moyn prefers a politicized human rights practice that builds Utopia 
out of existing reality whilst, at the same time, contesting that reality.235  
Moyn’s outline programme for the future of human rights grows out of his critique of 
contemporary human rights discourse and law:236 indeed, his critique is developed more 
extensively, across his three books, than his positive programme. In his first book, The Last 
Utopia: Human Rights in History, Moyn offers “[a]n alternative history of human rights, with 
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a much more recent timeline” than conventional accounts focussed on the post-World War Two 
era.237 Moyn argues that “[o]ver the course of the 1970s, the moral world of Westerners shifted, 
opening a space for the sort of utopianism that coalesced in an international human rights 
movement that had never existed before.”238 Critiquing the “formalism” and “minimalism” of 
1970s human rights utopianism,239 Moyn argues that human rights became extra-political:   
One of the distinctive features of human rights consciousness in the crucial years of the 
1970s was that appeal to morality could seem pure even where politics had shown itself to 
be a soiled and impossible domain … Human rights were preferable because they were 
strategically necessary and practically feasible, but also because they were morally pure. The 
disavowal of earlier utopias [of a more overtly political or revolutionary nature] took place 
in part out of the aspiration to achieve through a moral critique of politics the sense of a pure 
cause that had once been sought in politics itself.240 
I am concerned with Moyn’s blueprint utopianism and not with the accuracy of his historical 
analysis. The critique in The Last Utopia is that post-1970s human rights utopianism is more 
an outline sketch than a detailed blueprint: “[I]n the confusing tumult of 1970s social 
movements … [human rights] became bound up with the widespread desire to drop utopia and 
have one anyway.”241 Moyn’s problem with sketches is that they lack political content and 
programmatic detail. On his analysis it was the development of a distinctively formal, 
minimalist human rights culture in the 1970s that made human rights suited to the formalities 
of law. The alliance between human rights and international law is, on Moyn’s analysis, a story 
about formalised 1970s human rights coming to international law, rather than international law 
acquiring a substantive commitment to human rights values.242   
On Moyn’s account “even if their breakthrough [in the 1970s] depended on their antipolitics” 
in post-1970s cultural and social conditions “partisans of the human rights idea were forced to 
confront the need for political agenda and programmatic vision – the very things whose absence 
allowed for their utopia to emerge so spectacularly and discontinuously in the first place.”243 
Certainly by the 1990s, with “revelations of the Cambodian genocide … [and] the mid-1990s 
resurgence of ‘ethnic cleansing’,”244 1970s style formalist-minimalist human rights thinking 
was (apparently) in trouble: “From having triumphed because it lacked a political blueprint, the 
human rights movement was forced to draw up plans to remedy a crisis-ridden world.”245  
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Having critiqued the sketchy nature of 1970s and post-1970s human rights utopianism for much 
of the book, Moyn performs a partial volte-face towards the end of The Last Utopia, asking 
(and not answering the question of) whether human rights “should restrict themselves to 
offering minimal constraints on responsible politics, not a new form of maximal politics of their 
own.”246 Any doubts about Moyn’s commitment to programmatic, blueprint utopianism 
evaporate by 2012 when  perhaps surprisingly, given the post-9/11 U.S. experience in 
Afghanistan and Iraq  he calls for human rights to “engage in the programmatic concern with 
designing good states, for the sake of global economic welfare.”247  
Readers have to wait for 2018’s Not Enough, however, to get a sense of the blueprint Moyn 
favours, with his second book  2015’s Christian Human Rights  simply expanding and 
consolidating the critique. The Last Utopia argued that the true origin of human rights’ social 
and political prominence lay in the 1970s and not the 1940s. In a similar vein Christian Human 
Rights argues that connections between Christianity and human rights, particularly in the 1930s 
and 1940s, are not a mere aspect of human rights history  as much of the existing scholarship, 
on Moyn’s analysis, suggests  but central to that history.248  
Moyn contests the orthodox idea that liberal democratic values were expressed in and through 
“the annunciation of human rights in the 1940s,”249 in a manner consistent with a revolutionary 
tradition stretching back to the French Revolution and “droits de l’homme.”250 He argues that 
“through this lost and misremembered transwar era, it is equally if not more viable to regard 
human rights as a project of the Christian right, not the secular left.”251 Moyn approaches the 
1940s as a period in which “the Christian right” succeeded in making a break with an earlier, 
revolutionary tradition of rights as a challenge to orthodoxy, order and the state. A conservative 
rights tradition emerged out of that break and for Moyn that tradition “haunts politics to this 
day, as the deepest aspirations of democracy changed [in the 1940s], prizing moderation against 
extremes over liberation of human capacity and restoring order to its regrettable if time-honored 
status as the centrepiece of justice.”252  
Moyn seeks to demonstrate the practicalities of this haunting, arguing that the Christian origins 
of the European human rights architecture, codified in the European Convention on Human 
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Rights, are reflected in recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights endorsing 
restrictions on the wearing of the burqa and niqab in France, Switzerland and Turkey.253 For 
Moyn these cases:  
owe part of their doctrinal rationale and perhaps their exclusionary implications not to the 
secularist associations of religious freedom but to the legacy of the religious struggle against 
communism once feared as secularism incarnate. The Muslim has taken the place of the 
communist in the contemporary European imagination.254 
He insists that “[i]f the human rights movement does not improve states – or even the hearts of 
the men and women that Christianity at its most ambitious and inspiring promised to transform 
– it will demand replacement, in the name of its own ideals or some better ones.”255 This 
conclusion, like the argument of The Last Utopia, is underpinned by a programmatic, utopian 
desire for tangible progress. 
In 2018’s Not Enough Moyn moves from arguing, in The Last Utopia and Christian Human 
Rights, for the value of pragmatic, blueprint utopianism as a response to the deficiencies and 
exclusions of extant human rights, to the presentation of an actual blueprint for the future of 
human rights:  
[M]y goal is to stake out a moderate position between those who claim that human rights are 
unrelated to political economy and distributive injustice (except of course to provide the 
essential tools for reining them in) and those who think the human rights revolution has been 
a mere sham masking inhumane domination.256   
Moyn opposes an idea of human rights that limits their purpose to the satisfaction of basic 
needs, advocating the pursuit of true equality: “Human rights, focused on securing enough for 
everyone, are essential – but they are not enough.”257 His argument develops in stages. First, 
the reader is invited to consider the France’s 1793-1794 Jacobin state and its management of 
the economy on the basis (to borrow Moyn’s quotation from Harold Laski) that “‘distinctions 
of wealth are legislative creations, and that, where crisis demands it, egalitarian innovation may 
be deliberately attempted.’”258 Next, Moyn argues for a “reread[ing]” of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as an instrument “connected with the believable empowerment 
and intervention of the state” in opposition to free-market, neoliberal readings of the UDHR an 
instrument supportive of “the prestige of non-governmental action or the cautious reform of 
judges.”259 Analysis of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s mid-1940s effort to refocus American 
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social policy on socio-economic rights follows,260 with the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) receiving rather less attention than might be thought 
necessary in a book about global socio-economic equality.261  
Moyn considers the New International Economic Order – a 1970s programme of action by 
newly independent states in the global South, seeking to address global economic imbalances 
between former imperial states in the global North and newly independent states in the global 
South – in sections of a chapter that also covers the post-war decolonization and the post-war 
fortunes of the International Labour Organisation.262 As Julieta Lemaitre observes, the structure 
of Not Enough suggests that for Moyn there is the U.S. and “the rest of the world.”263 That 
seems to explain why Moyn covers the NIEO  a collective, collaborative global South effort 
 in parts of a chapter that comes immediately after an entire chapter on mid-1940s U.S. socio-
economic policy.264  
Critique of the “turn away from socialism” in Amnesty International’s and Human Rights 
Watch’s work accompanies a negative review of Robert McNamara’s late-60s / early-70s 
World Bank presidency and his focus on alleviating “absolute poverty” rather than promoting 
equality.265 Expressing qualified agreement with Susan Marks and Naomi Klein, Moyn’s final 
chapter attacks the complicit relationship between human rights and neoliberalism, setting up 
an epilogue centred on the figure of “a modern Croesus” – the original Croesus being a 
fabulously wealthy Ancient Greek king – who “insists on a floor of protection, so that everyone 
living under his benevolent but total ascendency can escape destitution.”266  
For Moyn this “modern Croesus” embodies the situation of contemporary human rights: “We 
increasingly live in Croesus’s world.”267 The force of this argument is, perhaps, diminished by 
global financier George Soros’ endorsement on the book’s back cover (“[i]f we don’t address 
the growing global phenomenon of economic inequality, the human rights movement as we 
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know it cannot survive or flourish”) but, nevertheless, the book ends with a call to detach human 
rights from neoliberalism.268  
Pankaj Mishra, reviewing Not Enough in the London Review of Books, comments that “Moyn 
wants to reinstate socialism … as an ethical ideal and political objective.”269 The book starts 
with reflections on the legacy of Jacobinism  a statist, central-management approach to social 
and economic affairs  and ends with a George Soros-endorsed indictment of the super-rich, so 
Mishra seems to be right. Moyn’s blueprint is, ultimately, anti-neoliberalism (formalism and 
minimalism) and pro-socialism (equality and statism). It is built on a critique of the particularity 
and biases of extant human rights (the particular targets in The Last Utopia and Not Enough are 
formalism and minimalism, and, in Christian Human Rights, the faux-universalism of a human 
rights tradition in which Christianity has exerted significant but often overlooked influence).  
The charge against Allott, outlined above, is that he secures the coherence and appeal of his 
utopian blueprint by omitting relevant literature and ignoring history.270 The similar charge 
against Moyn is that his blueprint for the future of human rights achieves its coherence and 
contemporary appeal by preferring the status quo to radical change, limiting its ambition to 
what can ‘realistically’ be achieved within the current human rights system and ignoring the 
detail of the context in which that system operates. Considered together, Allott’s and Moyn’s 
work illustrate a central tension in blueprint utopianism. The blueprint will always be either too 
ambitious and consequently unrealistic (Allott), or too realistic and consequently lacking in 
ambition (Moyn). Equally, to make itself appealing to an audience the blueprint will necessarily 
omit, to a greater or lesser extent, aspects of the context in which it is situated in the form of 
relevant literature, significant history, contemporary events, or competing perspectives. There 
will, then, in the design of a utopian blueprint, always be too much or too little ambition, too 
much or too little detail. A review of the ambition and detail critiques as applied to Moyn’s 
work – the focus of the next section – illustrates the necessary limitations of blueprint 
utopianism in general.  
4.1   Ambition and Detail 
Paul O’Connell, reviewing Not Enough, argues in iconoclastic terms that “[t]he fundamental 
problem … is not neoliberalism, or poor distributional choices (though of course both matter), 
but the structural character of the extant social system.”271 He is troubled by Moyn’s 
“resign[ation] to the idea that there is nothing beyond capitalism,”272 claiming that “in 
continuing to treat capitalism as an unquestioned, perennial premise [Moyn’s] critique is, itself, 
not enough.”273 Zak Manfredi makes a similar point, asking whether, “[a]fter nearly four 
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decades of neoliberal hegemony, we might … pause to ask: is a (re)turn to the welfare state the 
most left political forces can hope for?”274 
Gráinne de Búrca critiques Moyn’s ambition from a different perspective, claiming that it is not 
– as O’Connell and Manfredi charge – lacking, but mis-directed. For de Búrca Moyn’s pre-
occupation with the “human rights movement” is “rather … odd” because “the system of 
capitalism” and “its more recent political incarnation in the guise of global and domestic 
neoliberalism” are, on de Búrca’s analysis, “among the root causes of the material inequality 
with which [Moyn] is concerned.”275 de Búrca suggests that Moyn ought to make capitalism 
and neoliberalism “the target of [his] ire,”276 assuming the very separation between 
neoliberalism and human rights that Not Enough seeks to problematize.277 There is, of course, 
no ‘right’ answer to the question of whether there is a human rights system and a separate 
capitalist / neoliberal system. That seems to be de Búrca’s view, with O’Connell preferring the 
notion of one global, capitalist system that has a human rights component. Moyn holds neither 
of these views:  
[M]y goal is to stake out a moderate position between those who claim that human rights are 
unrelated to political economy and distributive injustice (except of course to provide the 
essential tools for reining them in) and those who think the human rights revolution has been 
a mere sham masking inhumane domination.278   
O’Connell’s insistence on “the structural character of the extant social system” comes close to 
the latter view (“the human rights revolution has been a mere sham masking inhumane 
domination”), and de Búrca’s bifurcated analysis of “the human rights movement” and “the 
system of capitalism” comes close to “claim[ing] that human rights are unrelated to political 
economy.” Moyn insists that human rights can and must pursue global equality by challenging 
capitalism’s distributional effects, perceiving two inter-connected systems – capitalism and 
human rights – with human rights, at their best, serving as a check on the functioning of the 
capitalist machine. 
O’Connell goes beyond Moyn’s two overlapping systems, insisting that everything in “the 
extant social system” is capitalism, whilst de Búrca objects to what she sees as Moyn’s attack 
on human rights because capitalism is, for her, the more appropriate punch bag. Moyn fully 
appreciates the potency of the conservative (de Búrca) and radical (O’Connell) perspectives – 
hence his definition of Not Enough’s “goal” in terms of a “moderate position” – and, responding 
to O’Connell, defends his moderacy:   
Karl Marx’s central mistake … was his belief [which, Moyn implies, O’Connell shares] in 
take-it-or-leave-it ‘systems’ of production, exchange, and distribution when political history 
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and legal theory since suggest that what we are really dealing with are makeshift and 
ramshackle assemblages with radically different outcomes for participants.279 
The disagreement between de Búrca, Moyn and O’Connell is a case of the conservative, the 
radical and the moderate talking past each other because they subscribe to divergent social and 
political theories. No resolution of the background theoretical tension is possible, but the three 
perspectives can be evaluated in terms of what they make possible.  
de Búrca invokes the ideal of a “revitalized democratic system” and,280 maintaining her 
insistence on the separateness of systems, claims: 
The reality … is that the human rights system has not succeeded in the promotion of socio-
economic rights and justice in large part because political systems – political leaders and 
parties, as well as financial institutions – in an era of neoliberalism have not been committed 
to redistribution but instead have willingly facilitated the accumulation of wealth by the 
wealthy.281 
What is the value of maintaining this separation between human rights and politics? Perhaps its 
value lies in allowing those with professional and intellectual attachments to human rights to 
park responsibility for any failure “in large part” in some other system. Doing so may draw the 
sting from critiques like Moyn’s but it does nothing to make new and better futures possible. 
Echoing my critique (above) of Cassese’s and Koskenniemi’s perspectives, de Búrca’s 
approach “shuts itself up” too much “within” human rights.282  
To the extent that de Búrca offers proposals for a better future they involve “a wholehearted 
embrace of the indivisibility of civil and political rights and economic social and cultural rights” 
as favoured by “proponents such as Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.”283 If this 
“wholehearted embrace” fails to deliver, responsibility will, presumably, again be laid “in large 
part” at the door of the political system, thereby saving human rights from those, like Moyn, 
who can be dismissed as “advancing provocative but somewhat artificial and exaggerated 
critiques.”284 If it is a choice between “artificial and exaggerated critiques” that challenge 
human rights to directly contest material inequality, and cycles of denial driven by an apparent 
desire to insulate and separate human rights from the ugly realities of political contestation and 
global capitalism, then I choose critique.   
O’Connell’s view offers a third, iconoclastic possibility, beyond critique and denial – namely, 
that attention should be focussed on “the structural character of the extant social system,”285 
which is to say, capitalism. The force of this perspective depends on its analysis of capitalism 
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as the all-encompassing, global social-economic-political-legal system. On the basis outlined 
in part one of this article I am sympathetic to O’Connell’s iconoclasm, but his argument as 
presented does not demonstrate why his “take-it-or-leave it” analysis should prevail over 
Moyn’s “makeshift and ramshackle” view (and it is, of course, unrealistic to expect something 
on that scale from O’Connell’s brief review of Moyn’s book).286 The profound and existential 
threats to the future and future quality of human life posed by climate change – which do not 
feature in Moyn’s work – demonstrate why, as Kim Stanley Robinson suggests,287 an 
iconoclastic, utopian perspective, akin to O’Connell’s position, is essential. In the next sub-
section I seek to explain why the reality of climate change tips the balance in favour of an 
O’Connell-type, iconoclastic perspective and against the conservative (de Búrca) and moderate 
(Moyn) views. For present purposes, however, I turn to consider the detail critique of Moyn’s 
work in more detail.  
O’Connell notes that Not Enough’s repeated “references to ‘the human rights movement’” treat 
it “as if it were a singular monolithic entity,” glossing over the divergence between the work of 
“large human rights multinationals” like Human Rights Watch whom Moyn critiques and the 
activities of smaller, more radical organisations like Via Campesina that Moyn does not 
discuss.288 O’Connell’s point is not that Moyn ought to have analysed all human rights 
organisations, but that Moyn fails to “disaggregate or unpack the complexity of ‘the human 
rights movement.’”289  
A concern about over-inclusiveness  about Moyn’s use of intellectual drift nets that catch more 
than might have been intended, for all that they yield a saleable, easily packaged, easily 
communicated argument  also underpins de Búrca’s analysis. She objects to Moyn’s 
suggestion that “status equality, however honoured in the breach” – ‘status equality’ being, in 
Moyn’s terms, the basic idea that “[n]o one ought to be treated differently because of the kind 
of person they are” – “is more accepted than ever before,”290 with a “greater consensus than 
ever that the high and equal status of human beings entitles them to some basic political 
freedoms, such as the rights to speak and to be free from torture.”291 de Búrca describes this 
idea of broad consensus as “breathtaking in either its naïveté or disingenuousness” in the 
context of inequalities in police treatment, incarceration and education affecting African-
Americans, “violence against women,” and widespread and persistent discrimination and 
violence against “‘lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender … people of all ages and in all regions 
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of the world’.”292 de Búrca also contests the divide Moyn maintains between “the (relatively 
successful [on Moyn’s analysis]) struggle for status equality” and “the (unsuccessful [on 
Moyn’s analysis]) struggle for socio-economic justice,”293 arguing that the divide is not tenable 
because those “working on issues of racial equality in the USA” or “gender equality” would 
not see status and identity issues as “meaningfully separate” from the “socio-economic justice 
and material inequality” challenges facing communities and individuals.294  
Commenting on The Last Utopia, Antony Anghie notes that “[i]t is a regular technique of 
Moyn’s to acknowledge important events that might challenge his thesis and yet elide their 
significance for his argument.”295 Anghie suggests that Moyn has a tendency to over-simplify, 
noting that whilst “Moyn has an impressive ability to present complex histories and events in 
succinct and insightful ways … in trying to demonstrate the distinctiveness of particular models, 
he may assert … disjunctures too emphatically.”296 Anghie is concerned with particular aspects 
of Moyn’s treatment of the history of human rights but his point – that Moyn “assert[s] … 
disjunctures too emphatically” and diminishes the significance of evidence that speaks against 
his argument – maps onto de Búrca’s view that Moyn draws too stark a line between status 
equality and material equality. Anghie seems to suggest that Moyn’s arguments would not 
appear so “succinct and insightful” if they engaged with the true complexity of the issues they 
address.  
Perhaps we can go one step further and contemplate the possibility that the issues Moyn chooses 
to address are pre-determined by his style of analysis and argumentation. Despite its focus on 
material equality and human wellbeing Moyn’s utopian project does not address climate 
change, perhaps the most complex and insurmountable challenge to future human wellbeing 
and material equality. In view of Anghie’s critique, it is tempting to suggest that Moyn fails to 
address climate change precisely because its complexity makes it an unsuitable subject for 
“succinct and insightful” treatment; the issue is just too complex and challenging to be 
addressed in a compelling, coherent and programmatic narrative.    
Connecting the two central critiques on which I have focused in this section, I am suggesting 
that Moyn omits the detail of climate change from his blueprint because including that detail 
would disturb its coherence and appeal. Responding to climate change necessitates, I suggest, 
high levels of ambition: radical proposals capable of overhauling relations between human 
beings and the planet, not “moderate” proposals of the kind Moyn favours. Moyn is committed 
to ways of thinking that operate within the existing social and political system, and it is difficult 
to address climate change from that perspective. Moyn addresses that difficulty, I argue, not by 
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reformulating his thinking to address the climate change challenge, but by excluding climate 
change from his thinking.  
4.2   The Changing Climate 
Moyn advocates global material equality without considering environmental and climatic 
changes that will make a good quality of life impossible to sustain for many, if not most. As 
Bruno Latour comments:  
Without the idea that we have [with climate change] entered into a New Climatic Regime, 
we cannot understand the explosion of inequalities, the scope of deregulation, the critique of 
globalization, or, most importantly, the panicky desire to return to the old protections of the 
nation-state.297 
To appreciate the significance of Moyn’s failure to address climate change in a book about 
global equality, and in his work more generally, a brief review of global climate governance 
and the scale of the climate change threat is necessary.  
The 2015 Paris Agreement commits (as of 2nd August 2019) 185 states to a “strengthen[ing of] 
the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development 
and efforts to eradicate poverty,” in particular by “[h]olding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”298 A 2018 IPCC (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change) report concluded that “[g]lobal warming is likely to reach 1.5°C 
between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate.”299 The report also 
concluded that climate change commitments (in the period up to the report’s publication) by 
Paris Agreement parties covering the period to 2030 “would not limit global warming to 1.5°C 
even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of emissions 
reductions after 2030.”300  
The report details the anticipated impacts of a 1.5°C global temperature rise. “Coral reefs … 
are projected to decline by a further 70-90% at 1.5°C ([the IPCC has] high confidence [in this 
conclusion])… with larger losses (>99%) at 2°C ([the IPCC has] very high confidence [in this 
conclusion].”301 “[L]imiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, could reduce the 
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number of people exposed to climate-related risks and susceptible to poverty by up to several 
hundred million by 2050 ([the IPCC has] medium confidence [in this conclusion].”302 “[M]odel-
based projections of global mean sea level rise (relative to 1986-2005) suggest an indicative 
range of 0.26 to 0.77 m by 2100 for 1.5°C of global warming, [which is] 0.1 m … less than for 
a global warming of 2°C ([the IPCC has] medium confidence [in this conclusion])” (and, in 
terms of that 0.1m difference, it is relevant to note the IPCC’s related conclusion that “[a] 
reduction of 0.1m in global sea level rise implies that up to 10 million fewer people would be 
exposed to related risks, based on population in the year 2010 and assuming no adaptation ([the 
IPCC has] medium confidence [in this conclusion]”).303 
Kelly Levin of The World Resources Institute explains that “[t]he world is currently on track 
to emit more than double [the amount required to limit warming to 1.5°C] by 2030,” adding 
that to limit warming to 1.5°C global “emissions will need to drop by 40-50 percent.”304 In 
summary, then, roughly four years on from the conclusion of the Paris Agreement its most 
ambitious target of limiting temperature increase to 1.5°C looks unachievable and, on the basis 
of the IPCC’s 2018 report, the consequences of that appear catastrophic. 
Fiji is experiencing a rise in sea level and increased sea water flooding that has “made portions 
of the island nation uninhabitable.”305 The vulnerability of small island developing states 
(SIDS) like Fiji to climate change impacts – “sea-level rise, changing precipitation patterns, 
increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, ocean acidification and coral 
bleaching”306 – raises pressing issues of social and material equality. The costs and challenges 
of adapting to climate change place a burden on SIDS that is often met through donor aid,307 
but reliance on donor aid disempowers those directly affected by climate change: “donor 
funding is available for what donors see as a priority – which does not necessarily reflect 
communities’ priorities.”308 The impact of climate change on SIDS is wholly unequitable as 
“[t]hey account for less than 1% of greenhouse gas emissions, but are among the most 
vulnerable to climate change impacts and sea-level rise.”309 
Germanwatch is a non-governmental climate research and policy organisation that produces an 
annual index analysing data “on the impacts of extreme weather events and associated socio-
economic data.”310 The Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index 2019 notes that: 
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306 Carola Betzold, “Adapting to climate change in small island developing states” (2015) 133(3) Climatic Change 
481, 482. 
307 See ibid, in particular at 486.  
308 Ibid. 486.  
309 Poh Poh Wong, “Small island developing states” (2011) 2(1) WIREs Climate Change 1, 2.   
310 David Eckstein, Maria-Lena Hutfils and Maik Winges, “Global Climate Risk Index 2019: Who Suffers Most 
From Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017”, accessible via 
37 
 
[o]f the ten most affected countries and territories (1998-2017), eight were developing 
countries in the low income or lower-middle income country group, one was classified as an 
upper-middle income country (Dominica) and one an advanced economy generating high 
income (Puerto Rico).311  
The Index “indicates a level of exposure and vulnerability to extreme events, which countries 
should understand as warnings in order to be prepared for more frequent and/or more severe 
events in the future.”312 Whilst “the link between certain weather events and climate change is 
still a frontier in science,”313 there is widespread support for the claim that extreme weather 
events and climate change are linked. The Index notes that “[t]he IPCC has already predicted 
that risks associated with extreme events will continue to increase as the global mean 
temperature rises.”314 
Extreme weather events have a real and current impact on communities and lives, 
predominantly in developing states. The Index notes that in 2017: 
Massive rainfalls have led to floods across Nepal, Bangladesh and India, which affected 
more than 40 million people. 1 200 people lost their lives in these three countries and 
millions were displaced throughout the region. The floods spread across the foothills of the 
Himalayas and brought landslides leaving tens of thousands of houses and vast areas of 
farmland and roads destroyed … Nearly 250 people were killed by collapsed buildings or 
drowning in regions of India, Nepal and Bangladesh. 950 000 houses were damaged or 
destroyed in the floods.315 
Moyn’s Not Enough is sub-titled Human Rights in an Unequal World. The inequalities and 
threats to wellbeing at the heart of climate change are among the most pressing and 
consequential in the world today and, as the Germanwatch Index indicates, the impact of 
climate change is expected to intensify. Moyn has written a book about global material 
inequalities and pursued a wider utopian project centred on human rights and human welfare.  
That book and that project omit any discussion of climate change and, in particular, its acute 
and worsening impact on developing states in the global South. This marks Moyn’s work as a 
product of the outdated orthodoxy that global social, economic, civil and political affairs can 
be debated without consideration of the environmental, reflecting a geographical bias towards 
the global North insofar as his work ignores the widespread, life-changing and present-day 
impacts of climate change on the global South. Perhaps Moyn would have written a different 
book had he been working at the Fiji campus of the University of the South Pacific. 
A number of voices have challenged a perceived geographical bias in Moyn’s work. Julieta 
Lemaitre, a Colombian judge, highlights what she sees as Not Enough’s U.S.-centrism,316 and 
                                                          
<https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202019_2.
pdf> (last visited 2nd August 2019), 3.  
311 Ibid 4.  
312 Ibid 3-4.  
313 Ibid 10.  
314 Ibid.   
315 Ibid 7.  
316 Lemaitre (n 263), and see Lemaitre quotations in n 263.  
38 
 
Karuna Mantena argues that Moyn “subsumes the NIEO [New International Economic Order] 
under the rubric of western welfarism, as if it were a global extension of the welfare state.”317 
For Mantena Moyn emphasises the work of “Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal” without 
giving the necessary prominence to “the progenitors of the NIEO themselves.”318  
Moyn notes that in 1958 Myrdal  who, in Moyn’s words, “pioneered a truly global 
economics”319  “gave the Storrs lectures at Yale Law School, which took up what he cast as 
the defining challenge of the age: scaling up the welfare state to the world stage.”320 He also 
cites the view of “Dutch international lawyer B.V.A. Röling” that the NIEO “meant the 
universalization of principles that were already applied in the ‘welfare state’” with apparent 
approval.321 The prominence Moyn gives to lectures at Yale and the views of European 
international lawyers like Röling suggests a global North perspective, and that suggestion is 
strengthened by the extensive analysis of U.S-centred, 1970s global ethics scholarship in Not 
Enough’s final chapter.322  
Not Enough lacks critical reflection on what is at stake in practices of universalisation. The 
argument, as presented, fails to foreground the impact of the author’s own perspective on its 
construction. If viewed from a global South perspective it is, I suggest, inconceivable that Moyn 
would or could have ignored climate change. Moyn’s method implies that global social reality 
is graspable, but “[t]he social totality is always unrepresentable.”323 “[H]umanity” is invoked 
on Not Enough’s final page but it is not clear what Moyn means by “humanity,”324 where 
“humanity” lives, or whose particular interests “humanity” shares or prefers.325 As Anghie asks, 
“whose utopia” is Moyn arguing for?326  
Moyn protests against the charge of U.S.-centrism, arguing that whilst “[t]he book inevitably 
reflects some American assumptions … it is certainly not legitimate to claim that it is about 
America from its revolution to the present or defiantly excludes the rest of the world in 
substance.”327 Maybe Not Enough is not “about America,” and perhaps the exclusion of the 
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“rest of the world” is not total. But it is telling that in The Last Utopia Moyn uses this basis to 
support his claim that “[t]he moral world had changed” in 1977:328  
Having been almost never used in English prior to the 1940s, when they experienced only a 
modest increase, the words “human rights” were printed in 1977 in the New York Times 
nearly five times as often as in any prior year in that publication’s history.329  
Moyn offers a graph that collates the use of “human rights” in the New York Times and the 
Times of London between 1785 and 1985.330 On any view, that graph is evidence of the use of 
those terms in one U.S. and one U.K. newspaper and not, as Moyn claims, evidence of some 
evolving global moral consciousness (assuming, in the absence of a definition, that this is what 
“the moral world” is intended to signify). To suggest, as Moyn does, that a New York Times / 
the Times perspective is, in some sense, the global perspective gives  to put it mildly – the 
appearance of U.S.-centrism and anglophone bias.331 Clarity and coherence are, here, achieved 
at the expense of detail.  
Moyn includes another graph in Not Enough, this one “generated via Google Books Ngram 
Viewer” and showing “[t]he comparative prominence of [the terms] human rights and 
socialism, as reflected by the percentage of English-language books in which the terms appear 
each year.”332 The graph’s two lines seem to suggest a rough correlation between a decline in 
the use of the term “socialism” around 1970 and, at around the same time, an increase in the 
use of the term “human rights.” It is difficult to know how the author sees this graph – he does 
not say – but it suggests another false equivalence between an exclusively anglophone evidence 
base and global social dynamics.  
These graphs of a tiny part of anglophone discourse, or the use of editorial practices at The New 
York Times as a means of capturing global social and political dynamics; Moyn’s emphasis on 
the work of Swedish economist Myrdal and the relative downplaying of the role of NIEO 
leaders, both noted by Mantena,333 alongside Moyn’s focus on anglophone, 1970s global ethics 
scholarship;334 his tendency to “assert … disjunctures too emphatically” and to “elide” counter-
arguments;335 and the omission of climate change, notwithstanding its profound significance 
for global justice, material equality, and any notion of the future. All of this adds up, in my 
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view, and as Anghie seems to suggest,336 to a scholarship whose style and clarity of 
argumentation is bought at the expense of rigour and depth.  
The appeal of Moyn’s arguments are rooted in their simplicity and clarity. The Last Utopia 
maintains that human rights achieved true global prominence in the 1970s and not in the post-
war period. Christian Human Rights argues that in the 1930s and 1940s the Christian right 
established a conservative, depoliticised rights tradition that continues to dominate human 
rights discourse. Not Enough insists that human rights has done little to address material 
inequality and challenge neoliberalism and that future efforts must focus on this goal, 
reinventing human rights in essentially socialist terms. Climate change is not suited to clear, 
simple arguments like these. It raises questions about the historic and contemporary relationship 
between global North and global South, problematizing Moyn’s easy invocation of a global 
“humanity.”337 The impacts of climate change raise questions about the sustainability of  
systems that societies employ to extract resources, materials, and wealth from the earth. Such 
questions cannot be addressed in “moderate” terms and from within the existing system because 
they are questions about the nature and viability of that system.  
It is true that climate change arises from the impact on the Earth of a global human population 
of 7.6 billion people (on 2017 UN data) and,338 in that sense, climate change is a global problem 
facing “humanity.” Framing the issue in these collective terms, however, misses the vital point 
that responsibility for climate change is not distributed equally between all states, all individuals 
currently alive, or all those who have lived. States that industrialised in the early stages of the 
Industrial Revolution – the U.S.A., for example – bear a historic and much greater responsibility 
for climate change than many of the states most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 
today  SIDS such as Fiji and The Federated States of Micronesia, for example  who have 
done, and are doing, very little to cause it.339 States that industrialised at an early stage acquired 
a global economic advantage by doing so. ‘Early adopters’ enjoy far greater technical, industrial 
and financial resources today than states which are not, in any meaningful sense, responsible 
for climate change despite being most exposed to its impacts (sea level rise, for example). This 
creates a very real divergence between states’ levels of responsibility for climate change and 
their degree of vulnerability to it.340  
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Many states in the global North used violent and exploitative methods, including processes of 
international legal argumentation, to acquire and extract resources from the global South.341 
They derived economic advantage from their use of those resources and, through that use, began 
the process of changing the global climate. The impact of those changes is felt most acutely 
today by climate-vulnerable states in the global South. In a sense, then, the global North has 
forced the global South to bear the environmental costs associated with the economic benefit 
that it (the global North) derived from the forcible seizure of the global South’s resources.342 
Moyn does not address this meta-level global equity issue in Not Enough.  
Despite the responsibility of early-industrialising states for climate change, and a sense that 
developed states’ financial support for adaptation to the impacts of climate change in 
developing states would go some way to recognising that responsibility, global levels of 
adaptation financing fall far short of what is required. The World Resources Institute reports 
that “[t]hose in greatest need of assistance – communities hit first and hardest by climate change 
– still struggle to access funds, receive disproportionately small shares of available finance and 
have little say in the allocation of such scarce resources.”343  
Under President Trump the U.S. has reneged on Obama administration commitments to support 
the Green Climate Fund  the principal global mechanism for adaptation financing. In a June 
2017 statement on U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement President Trump noted that the 
“Green Climate Fund … calls for developed countries to send $100 billion to developing 
countries all on top of America’s existing and massive foreign aid payments,” defending the 
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on the basis that it would have required “billions of 
dollars that ought to be invested right here in America [to] ... be sent to the very countries that 
have taken our factories and our jobs away from us.”344 Trump’s populist nationalism makes 
the result of Moyn’s search for a “better compromise between utopianism and realism”345  Not 
Enough’s U.S.-centric call for Jacobin-esque socialism  look more like a fantastical pipedream 
than a realistic blueprint.  
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An understanding of the colonial exploitation and oppression of the global South by the global 
North is, for the reasons set out above, central to any understanding of industrialisation. Equally,  
an understanding of industrialisation (including colonial exploitation and oppression) is central 
to any understanding of the history of global South and global North socio-economic 
development. Because processes of industrialisation in large part caused climate change, and 
because industrialisation is embedded in the colonial exploitation and oppression of the global 
South, any engagement with questions of global equality is incomplete without analysis of 
climate change. In that sense, then, Moyn’s failure to address climate change in Not Enough 
makes his entire analysis deficient. This reflects U.S.-centrism insofar as a scholar working in 
a more climate-vulnerable state – Fiji, for example – and writing about global equality would 
almost certainly find it hard to ignore climate change.  
The divide between climate justice and climate governance is well recognised and it would be 
trite – and, in the face of Trump-style populist nationalism, ineffective – to observe that the 
global North should do more to mitigate the impact of its present and historic economic and 
industrial activity on the global climate. Moyn’s blueprint-style of utopianism operates by 
making calls of that kind, calling for socialism at a time when Trump-style self-interest and 
nationalism seem to be on the rise. However “succinct and insightful” Moyn’s approach is,346 
and however well his books sell, arguments of that kind offer nothing new.   
There is a secondary sense, beyond that concerned with climate change per se, in which Moyn’s 
work and Not Enough in particular is out-of-step with a changing climate, the relevant climate 
here being the intellectual climate within utopian scholarship. There is, as we saw in the 
introduction to this article, a strong trend towards iconoclasm in utopian thinking, reflected in 
the work of scholars such as Jameson, Abensour and Marin. Moyn rejects iconoclasm, 
preferring blueprintism  modest correctives to orthodox histories, moderate prescriptions for 
a “different today.”347 He fails to address iconoclasm in any detail and John Gray critiques his 
work on that basis, noting “[Moyn’s] partial understanding of utopianism” and insisting that 
“[a] project is utopian when it can be known in advance that its central objectives cannot be 
realized.”348  
Perhaps Moyn prefers blueprintism to iconoclasm because a plan, however outline it may be, 
appears more “succinct and insightful” than an extended reflection on the necessity and 
impossibility of Utopia in postmodernity.349 Plans outlined in academic texts translate relatively 
easily into newspaper and magazine columns,350 while explanations of why fundamental 
change is both necessary and impossible do not. I argue that Moyn’s work is, in the final 
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analysis, defined by its pursuit of aesthetic appeal to present day audiences,351 reflecting the 
supremacy of commodification and consumption in contemporary postmodernity.352 It seems 
that history today needs to be presented as “glossy images,”353 graphs, and easily graspable 
narratives.  
Ben Golder defends Moyn’s utopianism,354 reading The Last Utopia as an exercise in 
Foucauldian genealogy, an “historical exposure of the groundlessness and non-necessity of 
human rights [that] simultaneously opens the way to a reimagining of their future.”355 He 
maintains that Moyn’s “genealogy of human rights … teaches us to be suspicious of claims of 
historical necessity and progress and to work against them in the present,”356 holding out the 
hope “of a different present and a possible future.”357 This, on Golder’s analysis: 
is a utopianism that is reflective, self-critical and self-aware, one always attuned to the 
mythic and exclusionary nature of its narratives and the remainders it produces, one that 
never cedes possibilities to the certitudes of progress or historical reason and that, in spite 
(or maybe because) of knowing all that it knows of the past, never ceases to hope for a new 
future.358 
Golder’s defence of Moyn’s blueprintism – “another, better world of dignity and respect,”359 “a 
political vision of a better world in the future (but without committing himself to a classic view 
that it is literally impossible or unrealisable, a ou-topos, as [Thomas] More conceived it)”360 – 
begs the question of whether a ‘new’ future is possible or imaginable in the contemporary 
present. Golder maintains that the achievement of Moyn’s genealogical utopianism is to break 
out of “destiny” so that “the future is (better yet: futures are) once again thinkable.”361 Like 
Moyn, Golder seems to prefer blueprintism – the conviction that it is possible to imagine 
genuinely ‘new’, ‘better’ futures in the contemporary present – to iconoclastic utopianism. But 
both Golder and Moyn state their preference without seriously considering the iconoclastic 
alternative and its insistence that contemporary, postmodern conditions make the imagination 
of genuinely ‘new’ futures impossible.  
5   Cassese and Koskenniemi, Allott and Moyn  
Koskenniemi’s and Cassese’s engagement with utopianism is driven by their desire to stay 
“within” international law’s boundaries. Their commitment is to international law and not to 
some utopian social or political project, and that precludes any possibility that, in their hands, 
utopianism will define international law. For Cassese and Koskenniemi blueprints for Utopia 
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are to be found by searching through extant international law – as the contributors to Cassese’s 
edited collection do – and not by starting with a blank sheet of paper. Philip Allott’s 
Eutopianism is so idealistic, so much outside of international law, material reality and history, 
that it becomes vulnerable to the anti-utopian critiques of messianism and a tendency towards 
totalitarianism framed by Popper, Berlin and Arendt.362 Having started with a blank sheet of 
paper Allott’s project is so much his own as to be virtually no-one else’s.  
Moyn’s project is avowedly utopian in its pursuit of a ‘better’ human rights system, a blueprint 
for action in the here and now that contrasts with Allott’s ahistorical blueprint for human self-
recreating through pure thought. Moyn engages with social, political and legal history far more 
than Allott, even if he does produce “glossy images,”363 and, in contrast with Cassese’s and 
Koskenniemi’s approach, Moyn is not so pre-committed to the structures and practices he 
considers as to be entirely constrained by them. If Cassese’s and Koskenniemi’s approach 
involves unambitious inquiry into such limited utopianism as there is within international legal 
discourse Moyn is, by contrast, open to the possibility that utopianism might re-invent the 
discourse or system of human rights. Because of its grounding in social, political and legal 
history, and its lack of the international legal “within”-ness that defines Cassese’s and 
Koskenniemi’s work, Moyn’s is the most comprehensive vision of utopianism in international 
legal scholarship to date.  
The potential of Moyn’s utopianism is, however, limited by its blueprintism. Those like 
O’Connell who critique Moyn for a lack of ambition maintain that his reform blueprint cannot 
meet contemporary social and political challenges because it accepts the basic structure of the 
extant social and political system. Those like de Búrca who critique Moyn’s mis-directed 
ambition see the problem as lying elsewhere: in some other system(s) or aspect(s) of social, 
political and economic life. Those, like Anghie, Lemaitre, and Mantena, who insist that every 
view comes from somewhere, and that no blueprint has universal application, highlight what 
can be seen as a parallel between Moyn’s and Allott’s work: the sense in which Moyn’s 
blueprint, if implemented in places and contexts other than that from which it originates, may 
tend towards an oppressive violence that overrides the particular.   
All these critiques bite. What Moyn offers is not Ou-topia (no-place), but a geographically 
situated, Americanised future, not Eu-topia (the good place) but a slightly less bad version of 
today.364 This is no basis on which to plan a utopian tomorrow because this is not a valid picture 
of today  it lacks detail (either in general or in some specific regard), or it underestimates the 
importance of identity, race, and gender.365  
Versions of these critiques could be applied to any utopian blueprint and the only way around 
them is to retreat to somewhere that has some limited utopian potential for a particular 
community. For Cassese and Koskenniemi that somewhere is the internal structure of 
international law with its appeal to international lawyers. For Allott that somewhere is “the 
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cloisters of Cambridge,”366 the utopian ideals of one’s own mind, and their supposed appeal 
for a nebulous “humanity.” Moyn’s somewhere is a place made in and by his own texts, a place 
where the picture of the world in the New York Times can be presented as global, where plans 
to “reinstate socialism” can be made to appear credible.367  
A somewhere to retreat to offers a (temporary) hideout from the deficiencies of any plan for a 
‘better’ future and the impossibility of overcoming those deficiencies. The only logical 
alternative to retreat into some intellectual structure (international law), oneself (Allott), or text 
itself (Moyn), is to remain rooted in the complexity and insurmountability of contemporary 
reality. Doing that entails acceptance of the iconoclastic view that any plan for a better future 
will be deficient in ambition and / or detail and, in that sense, that the very idea of a ‘plan’ for 
a better future is impossible, for all that plans for a better future are essential: “utopia is 
somehow negative … it is most authentic when we cannot imagine it.”368  
The very possibility of an iconoclastic approach, grounded in the notion that answers have not 
been arrived at because they are not available within existing paradigms of thought and 
practice, requires a turn away from blueprintism. To critique an iconoclastic posture on the 
basis that it does not have the answers is to assume that blueprints are the only form in which 
utopia can exist. It is also to miss the very point of the iconoclastic perspective: that moving 
beyond can only happen if there is recognition of the need for something beyond what is, rather 
than ‘new’ thinking within the confines of what is.  
The reality of climate change concretises the need for something beyond what is. There is a 
gap between current commitments to reduce emissions by parties to the Paris Agreement and 
the scale of action necessary to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels.369 If, thanks to the work of organisations such as the IPCC, we have an acutely 
developed understanding of the climate impact that “the consumption of sheer 
commodification as a process” has had and is having,370 we have no idea of how to change that 
process, how to break-out of the legacies of modernity, industrialisation, and colonialism that 
coalesce in postmodernity.  
International climate governance, in the form of the Paris Agreement, perpetuates the dream of 
international law as a discourse or collection of symbols or forms that offers the path to a better 
global future – indeed, the Paris Agreement seeks to define a future in which “the increase in 
the global average temperature [has been limited] to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels.”371 It is time to wake up from this dream, time to cast off the notion that the Paris 
Agreement and other utopian blueprints like it – the Charter of the United Nations,372 the Rome 
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Statute of the International Criminal Court,373 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights374 – 
map the path to a truly ‘better’ future. Equally, it is time to reject scholarship that promotes an 
image of international law as a utopian blueprint, whether in limited and conservative (Cassese 
and Koskenniemi), moderate and pragmatic (Moyn) or totalising and idealistic (Allott) form. 
Contemporary international law is, at best, a “degenerate utopia”  a means of effecting “the 
ideological closure of the system in which we are somehow trapped and confined,”375 of 
sustaining the idea of the future as “a different today rather than a more felicitous tomorrow”376 
 and I turn now to that aspect of my argument. 
Part 3: Utopia, “Degenerate Utopia,” and Disneyland 
Philosopher Louis Marin develops the concept of a “degenerate utopia” in his analysis of 
Disneyland (California), the original Disney theme park that first opened in 1955.377 That 
theme park may seem far removed from the terrain of international law but, in what follows, I 
aim to show that international law is, like Disneyland, a “degenerate utopia.”378 To do that I 
offer an account of Marin’s theory of utopia, connecting it with Fredric Jameson’s Marin-
informed analysis of Ursula Le Guin’s and Kim Stanley Robinson’s science fiction and 
contemporary evidence of Utopia’s social and political relevance. I then consider Marin’s 
theory of “degenerate utopia”, comparing and contrasting it with his theory of utopia, to 
produce an account of contemporary international law as a Disneyland-esque “degenerate 
utopia.”  
1. Neutralisation: Marin’s Utopia 
For Marin Utopia is a concept of the limit, a way of thinking the attempt to move beyond what 
is, “the neutral name, the name of the ‘neutral.’”379 “[T]he ‘netural’” – the key concept for 
Marin – “names the limit, the gap between two frontiers or two continents, the old and the new 
worlds.”380 Utopia “does not mean a place that is nowhere … an island that exists only in 
[Thomas] More’s imagination or a place that does not exist,”381 but “designates a no-place … 
another referent, the ‘other’ of any place.”382  
Utopia exists as potentiality rather than actuality. “It stands as a perfect idea above any 
limit,”383 “the plural figure of the infinite work of the limit or frontier or difference in 
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history.”384 It is not to be captured in a plan or blueprint because the attempt at containment 
tends towards authoritarianism: “Utopia as ideology is a totality; and when political power 
seizes it, it becomes a totalitarian whole.”385 As Jameson, analysing Marin’s work, explains:  
To understand Utopian discourse in terms of neutralization is … to propose to grasp it as a 
process, as energeia, enunciation, productivity, and implicitly or explicitly to repudiate that 
more traditional and conventional [blueprint] view of Utopia as sheer representation, as the 
‘realized’ vision of this or that ideal society or social ideal.386  
Any utopian text – such as Thomas More’s original Utopia – serves a neutralizing function.387 
More’s text is not a blueprint for the construction of a future society nor a mere critique of 
sixteenth-century England.388 On Marin’s analysis – which Jameson endorses – it is an exercise 
in neutralization, “‘neither anti-World, nor New World, but simply World other’”:389 “More’s 
Utopia is neither England nor America, neither the Old nor the New World; it is the in-between 
of the contradiction at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Old and New Worlds.”390 
This is Utopia as “the third term, neither positive nor negative, of each group of categories.”391 
“Utopic practice” – the practice of writing “World other” – is “an ideological critique of the 
dominant ideology.”392 Ideology, here, designates the mode of speaking, thinking and acting, 
as Terry Eagleton explains:  
[T]he concept of ideology aims to disclose something of the relation between an utterance 
and its material conditions of possibility, when those conditions of possibility are viewed in 
the light of certain power-struggles central to the reproduction (or also, for some theories, 
contestation) of a whole form of social life.393 
Ideology is the production of “whole form[s] of social life” through processes (“power-
struggles,” “material conditions of possibility”) which constrain what can be said or 
represented (“utterance”). As Marin puts it, “ideological discourse … expresses reality by way 
of a closed conceptual system whose aim is to provide a legitimizing or justificatory 
representation of the world.”394 Utopic practice, as “an ideological critique of the dominant 
ideology,”395 seeks to neutralise a “whole form of social life” – in More’s case, early sixteenth 
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century England – by performing “World other,” “subvert[ing] the picture of reality given by 
ideological discourse” in the process.396 
Utopic practice is not, then, an exercise in drawing up blueprints for an alternative future.397 It 
is a process of writing texts that neutralise what is, texts that “‘give the signal that we are 
coming out of the series … entering into the possible, the unfated … at least into a fate that can 
[by reaching beyond the confines of “the dominant ideology”] be modified.’”398 Consistent 
with this understanding of “Utopic practice,” Fredric Jameson promotes the utopic practice of 
science fiction authors Ursula Le Guin and Kim Stanley Robinson.399  
For Jameson, “Utopian space is an imaginary enclave within real social space.”400 “[R]eal 
social space” in postmodernity, according to Jameson, involves the bureaucratisation of life 
and reality by ever-more specialised disciplines, systems, and forms of knowledge.401 Jameson 
evokes something of Cassese’s and Koskenniemi’s “within”-ness, referring to “jurists, who 
become a separate profession governed by a distinct field of knowledge in its own right” as an 
example of bureaucratised specialisation.402 Each discipline or system carves out a distinct and 
sealed domain of conduct, process and behaviour for itself, fragmenting the “real social space” 
by doing so.403 “Utopian space”, by contrast, is a “pocket of stasis within the ferment and 
rushing forces of social change [that] may be thought of as a kind of enclave within which 
Utopian fantasy can operate.”404 Against the bureaucratisation, sub-division, and specialization 
of life in postmodernity, the Utopian “imaginary enclave” is “a zone of the social totality which 
seems eternal and unchangeable.”405  
Utopia, then, offers an image of the whole, and the “fictive” possibility of re-constructing life 
and reality.406 Utopia is not concerned with the representation of “contemporary social reality” 
per se because it is “the other or negative of contemporary social reality [that] appears” through 
Utopia’s “fictive construction.”407 The problem, in a sense, then, with Samuel Moyn’s blueprint 
for human rights, or Philip Allott’s Eutopian plan for international law – to take two examples 
from the first part of this article – is that they are presented as real(istic) and achievable when 
they are, in the context of postmodern, “contemporary social reality,” fantastical. Moyn and 
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Allott approach utopianism as though it is a pragmatic exercise in re-orienting thought, 
practice, theory, doctrine, or discourse when  as Marin’s and Jameson’s analysis reveals  
Utopia, as a literary practice with roots stretching back to Thomas More, is a “fictive” exercise 
in creating “the other or negative” of the context in which it is written.  
If we are, then, to understand the present-day value and potential of utopianism we need to 
consider the contemporary “fictive” literature.  
2. “Our constitutional inability to imagine Utopia”: Le Guin, Robinson, and Jameson 
Through analysis of Le Guin’s and Robinson’s works Jameson develops his thesis that “the 
political function of the utopian genre” and of science fiction in general “is to bring home, in 
local and determinate ways and with a fullness of concrete detail, our constitutional inability 
to imagine Utopia itself … as a result of the systemic, cultural and ideological closure of which 
we are all in one way or another prisoners.”408  
In The Lathe of Heaven Le Guin tells the story of a “hapless young man … tormented by the 
unwanted power to dream ‘effective dreams’ … which … change external reality itself … 
reconstruct[ing] the … historical past in such a way that the previous ‘reality’ disappears 
without a trace.”409 He seeks the help of “an ambitious psychiatrist” who harnesses this power 
“to change the world for the benefit of mankind.”410 The dreamer’s dreams, each designed to 
make the world a better place, change reality again and again, with a range of unintended 
consequences (mass deaths and alien invasion, for example).411  
Whilst Lathe’s narrative might be read “either as [a manifestation of] the liberal’s anxiety in 
the face of a genuinely revolutionary transformation of society” – the capacity to dream a new 
world into being – “or as the expression of more conservative misgivings about the New Deal-
type reformism and do-goodism of the welfare state,”412 for Jameson “the deeper subject of 
this fascinating work can only be the dangers of imagining Utopia and more specifically of 
writing the utopian text itself.”413 On Jameson’s analysis the book “is ‘about’ its own process 
of production.”414 Whilst the dreamer “cannot dream Utopia” into being, however much the 
psychiatrist wants him do so, “in the very process of exploring the contradictions of [the 
attempt to produce Utopia that the novel narrates], the narrative gets written, and ‘Utopia’ is 
‘produced’.”415  
The point is that Le Guin’s text is a negative, dialectical iconoclastic Utopia because “we are 
shown that an ‘achieved’ Utopia – a full representation – is a contradiction in terms.”416 By 
narrating the contemporary un-dreamability of utopia Le Guin’s text stages the reality of 
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Utopia’s unreality in contemporary cultural conditions. If Philip Allott was to re-visit his 
Eutopianism on the basis of Lathe, perhaps he would caveat his declaration that “[h]uman 
beings inhabit a human world, entirely made by the human mind.”417 If Samuel Moyn was to 
read Lathe into his work, perhaps he would rethink his call for human rights to “become more 
scientific” by “engag[ing] in the programmatic concern with designing good states, for the sake 
of global economic welfare.”418  
Another of Le Guin’s novels, Left Hand of Darkness, is set on the frozen planet of Gethen / 
Winter, “an inimical world; its punishment for doing things wrong is sure and prompt; death 
from cold or death from hunger.”419 In this “utopian enclave” a drama of gender and 
androgyny,420 conflict, mediation, love and loss plays out. The two central characters are Genly 
Ai, a representative of the Ekumen  “a kind of galactic United Nations,”421 “a clearing-house 
for trade and knowledge” that ensures “communication between the worlds of men”422 – and 
Estraven, a politician in Karhide, a nation on Gethen. Genly Ai is male and Estraven, like 
everyone on Gethen, is androgynous. Notes prepared by Ekumen ‘Investigators’ – an advance 
party who surveyed Gethen in preparation for Genly Ai’s visit – explain that the absence of 
gender on Gethen changes not only sex but social interaction:  
The First Mobile [Genly Ai is the ‘First Mobile’ or envoy from Ekumen], if one is sent, 
must be warned that unless he is very self-assured, or senile, his pride will suffer. A man 
wants his virility regarded, a woman wants her femininity appreciated, however indirect and 
subtle the indications of regard and appreciation. On Winter [Gethen] they will not exist. 
One is respected and judged only as a human being. It is an appalling experience.423 
“Gethenian sexual physiology” involves processes of “somer” and “kemmer,” somer being the 
non-sexually active phase of Gethenian life lasting “[f]or 21 or 22 days,”424 and Kemmer 
“averag[ing] 26 to 28 days” and involving the development of sex organs:425 “Normal 
individuals have no predisposition to either sexual role in kemmer; they do not know whether 
they will be the male or the female, and have no choice in the matter.”426  
Androgynous Gethenians are “not neuters” but “potentials, or integrals.”427 The Investigator 
concludes “I must say ‘he’ [to refer to a Gethanian], for the same reasons as we used the 
masculine pronoun in referring to a transcendent god: it is less defined, less than the neuter or 
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the feminine,”428 but recognises that “the very use of the pronoun in my thoughts leads me 
continually to forget that the Karhider I am with is not a man, but a manwoman.”429  
Genly Ai seeks to make “an alliance with the nations of Gethen” in the interests of “[m]aterial 
profit. Increase of knowledge. The augmentation of the complexity and intensity of the field of 
intelligent life. The enrichment of harmony and the greater glory of God. Curiosity, 
Enrichment, Delight.”430 Just before Genly Ai’s meeting with the king of Karhide Estraven is 
branded a traitor and banished. Karhide and Orgoreyn, another nation on Gethen, are enemies 
and when he travels to Orgoreyn Genly Ai is surprised to meet the newly banished Estraven. 
Events lead Genly Ai and Estraven to make an almost impossible journey across icy 
wastelands, discovering their love for each other as they travel. Out “[o]n the [i]ce” (the title 
of the chapter in which Genly Ai discovers his love for Estraven), having left the social and 
political complexities of Karhide and Orgoreyn behind, Genly Ai forgets his blueprints for 
intergalactic order, peace, and trade: “Estraven and I … simply arrived at the point where we 
shared whatever we had worth sharing.”431 For this to happen Genly Ai has to overcome his 
binary understanding of gender:  
And I saw then again, and for good, what I had always been afraid to see, and had pretended 
not to see in him: that he was a woman as well as a man … Until then I had rejected him, 
refused him his own reality. … [H]e was the only one who had entirely accepted me as a 
human being: who had liked me personally and given me entire personal loyalty: and who 
therefore had demanded of me an equal degree of recognition, of acceptance. I had not been 
willing to give it. I had been afraid to give it. I had not wanted to give my trust, my friendship 
to a man who was a woman, a woman who was a man.432  
The Left Hand ends with the violent death of Estraven, Genly Ai’s return to Karhide, and the 
ultimate success of his mission as an Ekumen spaceship arrives in Karhide and contact is 
established with the nations of Gethen. For Jameson a sense of “the Ekumen as a kind of 
galactic United Nations” permeates the “liberal ‘solution’” of the book’s conclusion.433 Genly 
Ai claims, in discussions with the king of Karhide, that he and the dead Estraven served 
“[m]ankind” in their efforts to establish contact between Gethen and the Ekumen.434 Privately, 
to the reader, however, Genly Ai notes that this was only “an aspect of the truth” for “[i]t would 
be no less true to say that Estraven’s acts had arisen out of pure personal loyalty” to him.435  
Genly Ai admits that he summoned the Ekumen spaceship that is on its way as he meets with 
the king “[t]o force [the king’s] hand,” invoking his “duty towards Gethen and the Ekumen” 
as justification.436 This sense of knowing better  of gently and forcibly bringing about 
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socialisation between Karhide and the Ekumen  has overtones of the colonial “civilising 
mission.”437 For an international legal readership The Left Hand might evoke memories of de 
Vitoria’s On the Indians Lately Discovered, a sixteenth century text on the legal aspect of 
Spanish conquests in the ‘new world.’438 According to Antony Anghie:  
Vitoria argues that all peoples, including the Indians, were governed by a basic “natural 
law”. While others characterised the Indians as heathens, and animals, lacking any 
cognisable rights, Vitoria instead humanely asserts of the Indians that “the true state of the 
case is that they are not of unsound mind, but have according to their kind, the use of reason 
…” [I]t is precisely because they possess reason that the Indians are bound by a universal 
natural law.439  
On this basis Anghie maintains that the people of the New World, held to the standards of 
European natural law, would “by their very existence and their own unique identity and cultural 
practices, violate this law.”440 Vitoria, Anghie argues, maintained that the Spanish had a right 
to travel to and trade with the New World, and that “any Indian resistance to Spanish incursions 
would amount to an act of aggression by the Indians that justified the Spanish in using force in 
self-defence – and, in doing so, in endlessly expanding their territory, conquering the native 
rulers in the process.”441 What starts with contact, trade and universality – with “mankind,” 
communication, trade and knowledge – ends with wars for control of the New World, with the 
landing of spaceships. 
According to Jameson, “the deepest subject of [The Left Hand] … would not be utopia as such, 
but rather our own incapacity to conceive it in the first place.”442 In reaching this view he 
attaches particular importance to this line from a chapter ‘written’ by Estraven:443 “To learn 
which questions are unanswerable, and not to answer them: this skill is most needful in times 
of stress and darkness.”444 This sense of remaining neutral recurs elsewhere in the chapter. 
Estraven tells the reader that “[t]o oppose something is to maintain it,”445 that “[t]o be an atheist 
is to maintain God.”446 We need new ways of doing things, not mere opposition to what is. We 
need something other than one of the two options constructed by the binary-ness of existing 
debates:  
To oppose vulgarity is inevitably to be vulgar. You must go somewhere else; you must have 
another goal; then you walk a different road … Orgoreyn and Karhide both must stop 
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following the road they’re on, in either direction; they must go somewhere else, and break 
the circle.447  
The challenge of “break[ing] the circle” permeates The Left Hand, for all that Genly Ai’s 
resolution of the narrative via the arrival of a spaceship involves a closure of, rather than a 
break in, the circle. That closure takes the form of the arrival of the Ekumen, and the initiation 
of a process through which, as Genly Ai tells the king of Karhide, “you [the people of Gethen] 
find unity.”448 The desire for a break, “the desire called utopia,”449 permeates the book but – of 
course  it goes unrealised and, in that sense, Estraven, as the voice of utopian desire  the 
narrative personification not of Utopia per se but of the desire for it  had to die.  
The book ends with Estraven’s son taking on his parent’s role as the voice of utopian desire, 
asking Genly Ai “[w]ill you tell us about the other worlds out among the stars – the other kinds 
of men, the other lives?”450 The child asks to be told stories about the ‘other,’ perhaps in the 
hope that through such stories we, as readers, might learn to “break the circle.” Le Guin spends 
more than two hundred pages telling a story of the ‘other,’ of Gethen, offering a non-answer to 
the “unanswerable” question of how in this time of “stress and darkness” we might imagine a 
Utopian ‘other.’451 Fittingly, the book ends with a child’s request for more such stories, a 
request that seems to break down the wall between writer and reader, effecting something like 
an Umfunktionierung.452  
As with Lathe of Heaven, in and through Le Guin’s text “‘Utopia’ is ‘produced’” by a staging 
of the dialectical impossibility of / imperative for Utopia in contemporary human reality,453 
transposed from Earth to the “utopian enclave” of Gethen.454 A dialectical sensibility infuses 
the whole book, expressed most clearly in lines invoking the book’s title: “Light is the left hand 
of darkness, and darkness the right hand of light. Two are one, life and death, lying together 
like lovers in kemmer, like hands joined together, like the end and the way.”455 On Gethen the 
“circle” of gender is broken and neutralised in androgyny but, as the child’s question at the end 
of the book demonstrates, a wider, more complete breaking of the circle that defines 
contemporary social, political and economic reality is not achieved.  
Le Guin’s staging of Utopia as an impossibility / imperative in Lathe and The Left Hand can 
be read together and in harmony with Theodor Adorno’s seminal work of critical philosophy, 
Negative Dialectics, published in 1966 (The Left Hand was published in 1969, Lathe was 
published in 1971). Adorno, like Estraven, opposes binary choices within the limits of existing 
options because “[w]hat is must be changeable if it is not to be all,”456 because “the conceptual 
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totality is mere appearance.”457 In terms that seem to speak to Genly Ai’s initial rejection of 
androgyny on Gethen, and his attempt to bring Gethen into a unified Ekumen, Adorno observes 
that “[w]hat we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, negative for just as long as the 
structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity: as long as its demand for totality 
will be its measure for whatever is not identical with it.”458  
Against the maintenance or defence of what is, Adorno insists that the focus must be on what 
lies beyond the extant totality: “An order that shuts itself up in its own meaning will shut itself 
away from the possibility above order”;459 “[t]he whole is the false;”460 “[t]rue thought is 
thought that has no wish to insist on being in the right.”461 
An attempt to reach for something ‘other’ underpins Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars trilogy. 
The “conditions of Being” are transformed in Robinson’s dramatization of the human 
colonisation of Mars via terraforming, “the process of creating an Earth-like or habitable 
environment on another planet.”462 For Jameson, Robinson’s narrative sits on “the fault line 
between realism and something else, which [Jameson] … call[s] ontology.”463 Whilst there are 
realist elements in Robinson’s narrative – extensive detail on the science of terraforming,464 an 
“inventory” of the “variety of tools and materials” required 465 – to describe this as realist 
literature is, for Jameson, to miss its true significance:  
“Terraforming” … retroactively includes all those implements, all those receptacles of 
human value [tools, materials, science, data, facts], and it becomes the fundamental dividing 
line between realism as the narrative of human praxis and ontology as the traces of Being 
itself: two formal or generic possibilities, which thereby reinforce each other, insofar as 
production requires some pre-existent being on which to do its work, while Being itself can 
be detected only in the spaces that human praxis spares, in the evanescent chance at origins 
that time and history inexorably efface.466 
The Mars trilogy dramatizes the (fictive) science and politics of terraforming and the Being 
created and destroyed by terraforming: “[T]he hard SF content [the ‘science’] stands revealed 
as socio-political – that is to say, as utopian.”467 The point, here, is that the Earthly, familiar 
divide between science and politics falls away as Martian colonisers grapple with questions 
about what can and what should be done on and to this ‘new’ planet.   
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A drama of ecological, planetary politics plays out across the trilogy and its relevance for Earth 
is staged through “the obligatory return tourist trip to Earth itself.”468 During that trip one of 
the central characters “address[es] … the Terran [i.e. Earth-based] welcomers,”469 telling them:  
‘The move to Mars was a purifying voyage, stripping away all but the most important of 
things. What happened in the end was Terran through and through … we can most help the 
home planet by serving as a way for you to see yourselves. As a way to map out an 
unimaginable immensity.’470  
In this way Robinson’s text “inscribe[s] the structural condition of [its] possibility within the 
narrative itself.”471 Robinson’s trilogy does not “dramatize a single utopian possibility” but is 
“‘polymorphic’ … [in its] inclu[sion] of the struggle between a whole range of utopian 
alternatives, about which it deliberately fails to conclude.”472 From this, Jameson extracts these 
lessons:  
The utopian text is not supposed to produce th[e] synthesis [, the solution,] all by itself or to 
represent it; that is a matter for human history and for collective praxis. It is supposed only 
to produce the requirement of the synthesis, to open the space into which it is to be 
imagined.473 
[U]topia as a form is not the representation of radical alternatives; it is rather simply the 
imperative to imagine them.474 
It is of course possible to dismiss Le Guin’s and Robinson’s work as mere fiction, just as the 
word ‘Utopia’ can be used to dismiss ambitions for something other than what is. Such 
responses miss the point of the “fictive,”475 the utopian, and the ‘other’ however. Jameson’s 
analysis of Le Guin’s and Robinson’s work, and that work in its own right, posits the necessity 
of something that synthesizes discordant elements of contemporary reality into something other 
than what is.  
To gain some sense of the contemporary necessity of a new “synthesis,” inquiry into discordant 
elements in contemporary society, into whatever evidence there might be of the existence of a 
desire to “break the circle,” is necessary.  
3.  Finding the Exit: Brexit, Theranos, Fyre, Bolsanaro … 
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Some readings of the contemporary social and political situation suggest that the utopian 
“imperative” is only too well understood,476 that there is a real “desire called utopia,”477 and 
that the absence of a systemic alternative to what is makes that desire stronger.   
William Davies, writing in February 2019, interprets the UK’s decision to leave the European 
Union – ‘Brexit’ – as the manifestation of “a deep, generalised urge to depart” in “British 
political culture,”478 in a way that seems to exemplify the disconnect between utopian desire 
and the realisation of utopian blueprints. Davies presents Brexit as an exercise in “the ideology 
 or the fantasy  of exit” from consumer markets.479 In theory, if a consumer is dissatisfied 
with a product or service they “exit” by withdrawing their custom, but “markets never quite 
match up to this ideal” because people rarely “exit” in this way, preferring instead to “make a 
fuss.”480 On Davies’ reading Brexit “isn’t so much a celebration of sovereignty or democracy, 
as a new frontier in the marketisation of politics” driven by the illusion of the consumer’s “exit” 
sanction.481 Nothing, for Davies, shows the consumer logic of Brexit better than the Brexiteer 
mantra that “you don’t get a good deal on anything unless you’re willing to walk away.”482 It 
is, then, one thing to want to leave the European Union and an altogether ‘other’ (i.e. other 
worldly) thing to realise that desire.  
Brexit is not the only contemporary example of a utopian desire for something beyond what is 
and the impossibility of translating that desire into a blueprint. Take, as another example, the 
recent revelations about US biotech firm Theranos and its founder Elizabeth Holmes.483 By 
revolutionising medical testing with their blood testing device Theranos offered “accurate 
results from just a few drops of blood … us[ing] the same blood sample to test for hundreds of 
different conditions simultaneously.”484 Holmes promised “‘[a] world in which no one ever has 
to say goodbye too soon,’”485 a Utopia in which people can buy control over their medical 
future.   
The Theranos story was not true: 
[T]he company had been running most of its blood samples through the standard large 
commercial analysers made by the German conglomerate Siemens. Theranos had to dilute 
their tiny samples so that they could run through the machines … [and] the results couldn’t 
be trusted. Holmes’s device, the Edison, could only run a few tests, and its “results were no 
better than guesswork.” When employees ran their own blood through it, 20 per cent of them 
tested positive for syphilis. … When she sought investors, [Holmes] avoided the biotech 
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venture capital firms that would have demanded due diligence in favour of the charmable 
global rich.486  
Theranos’ Utopia was sustained by the widely held desire for what Holmes was selling. Rupert 
Murdoch, the family behind Walmart, and Betsy DeVos (current US secretary of education) 
invested.487 In 2014 Fortune magazine published a hagiographic article about Theranos and 
Holmes, extolling the efficiency and affordability of Theranos’s testing methods.488 When the 
truth about Theranos began to come out in 2015, after a pathologist in Missouri called a 
journalist at the Wall Street Journal because he did not believe the Theranos story could be 
true,489 the Fortune journalist who wrote the 2014 article published “a protracted correction:”490 
“As much as I’d like to say that Holmes lied to me, I don’t think she did. I do believe I was 
misled – intentionally – but I was also culpable, in that I failed to probe certain exasperatingly 
opaque answers that I repeatedly received.”491 US supermarket Walgreens allowed Theranos 
to set up shop in a number of their stores, as did their rival Safeway:492 “Walgreens executives 
had feared that if they hesitated to go into partnership with Theranos, they would lose out to 
their rivals.”493 Utopia seems to sell  to supermarkets, to journalists, to “the charmable global 
rich”  but everybody buying it pays to forget that Utopia is, in one of its senses, ‘no-place.’  
The story of 2017’s Fyre festival seems to transplant the essence of the Theranos story into an 
entertainment and tourism setting. The plan, developed by entrepreneur Billy McFarland and 
rapper Ja Rule, was to hold a luxury music festival on a private island in the Bahamas.494 The 
plan failed, the festival was cancelled, festival-goers were temporarily stranded in the 
Bahamas,495 McFarland has been jailed for fraud,496 and festival goers are suing the 
organisers.497 Fyre was announced online in a video that opens with a voiceover insisting “all 
these things that may seem big and impossible are not,” featuring “supermodels,” jet skis, 
beaches, crashing waves, and a deep-blue ocean.498 The imagery and the sales pitch involve an 
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exit from the norm, a departure from what is through travel to a private island:499 Thomas 
More’s Utopia for Millennials.  
Fyre invoked a sense of transgression, of pushing back against the orthodox – the island venue 
was, according to the promotional video’s text, “once owned by [drug baron] Pablo 
Escobar.”500 Social media ‘influencers’ were paid to promote Fyre on Instagram  Kendall 
Jenner was reportedly paid $250,000 for one post.501 Fyre’s ‘good’ place – “supermodels,” the 
best of everything, a private, luxury island – existed only in social media’s no place, and even 
there Fyre was a meaningless orange tile tweeted, and re-tweeted, and re-tweeted: “‘A couple 
of powerful models posting an orange tile is what essentially built this entire festival’ … says 
Mick Purzycki, one of the men behind Fyre Festival, in a new Netflix documentary.”502 The 
non-existence and impossibility of this festival was Fyre’s ‘unique selling point.’ ‘“Fyre was 
basically like Instagram coming to life”’ says DJ Jillionaire in the Fyre Netflix documentary,503 
his hyperbolically exaggerated name only too appropriate for this non-event.  
Heightening the parallel with Thomas More’s Utopia, the venue featured in the marketing 
material for Fyre was not the actual festival venue. McFarland and his associates forfeited the 
lease on the intended island venue after violating its terms – the lease prohibited any mention 
of Pablo Escobar but they mentioned the name in marketing material anyway – and had to 
relocate to a patch of land on a neighbouring island.504 Nothing about this Instagram Utopia is 
certain or fixed. Two competing documentary films, one made by Netflix, the other by Hulu, 
offer competing narratives about culpability for the festival’s failure amid claims that the 
festival’s marketing firm exerted too much influence over the Netflix film.505 Fyre’s exit from 
what is turned out to be non-existent, and nobody can agree why. This is Utopia as negation, 
as neutralisation; as a representation of the contemporary impossibility of exiting or escaping 
from what is even when you have the money for the ticket.   
Much of contemporary politics seems, like Brexit, to be driven by the desire for something 
‘other,’ by a search for an exit from what is. In 2018 Brazil elected Jair Bolsanaro as its 
president. Offering something like an alternative to Brazil’s recent history of corruption and 
political intrigue,506 Bolsanaro’s political career involves flirtation with an end to the liberal 
democratic orthodoxy via “military dictatorship … the death penalty … easier access to guns… 
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[and attacks on] leftists, homosexuals and other [perceived] enemies of society.”507 Brazil 
seems to prefer (perceived) authoritarian order, personified by a Twitter-campaigning 
strongman, to the continuing complexity and incoherence of democratic politics.508 This might 
seem more Dystopia than Utopia but it is worth remembering, as Juliette Werlin points out, 
that in More’s original text “rules operate seamlessly, with a uniform predictability that extends 
across every inch of territory and to every citizen living within its borders” within a rigid order 
of “[n]umbers:”509 
The 54 cities of Utopia each contain 6,000 households, governed by 200 lower magistrates 
who are themselves supervised by 20 higher officials. Utopian citizens adhere to a fixed 
schedule: “dividing the day into twenty-four hours, appoint six of these for work, three of 
which are before dinner and three after; they then sup, and at eight o’clock counting from 
non, go to bed and sleep eight hours.” Outside the cities, utopians serve rotating two-year 
shifts working on farms, where they live in households of at least 40 men and women, plus 
two slaves.510 
Utopia as a highly structured, authoritarian society where order matters more than equality 
(noting the reference to “slaves”)  perhaps Bolsanaro would approve.  
Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is widely regarded as an authoritarian state. Ella George 
tells a tale of exit, after exit, after exit in recent Turkish history, interpreting Erdoğan’s agenda 
as a “counter-revolution,”511 an exercise in “setting the clock back not to the moment of the 
republic’s founding [in 1923] but a century earlier, before the modernising and Westernising 
reforms of the 19th century.”512 According to George, Erdoğan has a “fascination with the 
Ottomans” and with “Abdul Hamid II, the last sultan who had real control over the Ottoman 
Empire” in particular.513 Whilst Erdoğan apparently regards Hamid as “a far-sighted reformer 
who would have modernised the state in ways consistent with indigenous Turkish traditions 
had he not been undermined by a Westernising clique,”514 for George “Erdoğan’s Hamidian 
myths sanitise history” because:515 
Hamid was responsible for a period of unprecedented repression, suspending the 
constitution and dissolving parliament … establish[ing] a network of informants and 
adopt[ing] a paranoid style of government that made him deeply unpopular… [in a] dark 
chapter of Ottoman history, known as the istibdat (“tyranny”) period.516 
                                                          
507 Ibid 19.  
508 See Anderson (n 506).   
509 Juliette Werlin, “Nowhere Now: Thomas More’s “Utopia” at 500” Los Angeles Review of Books, 
<https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/nowhere-now-thomas-mores-utopia-at-500/> (last visited 2nd August 2019).   
510 Ibid.  
511 Ella George, “Purges and Paranoia” (2018) 40(10) London Review of Books 22, 22 
512 Ibid.  
513 Ibid 32.  
514 Ibid.  
515 Ibid.  
516 Ibid.  
60 
 
First comes an exit from the Ottoman period with the formation of the secular Republic in 
1923.517 After a few false starts, as challenges to Turkey’s secularism were repressed in the 
late-1990s, comes the rise of the AKP – Erdoğan’s political party – in the early 2000s and an 
attempt at Turkey’s re-Ottomanisation.518 George’s account ends with the suggestion that 
opposition to Erdoğan is on the rise,519 the negativity of anti-Erdoğanism seemingly overriding 
any sense of a positive next step. Flawed attempts to satisfy desires via blueprints generate 
disaffection, which leads to calls for an exit, which forms into a blueprint that fails to satisfy 
the exit-desire out of which it arose, which, in turn, inspires a desire for an exit from the most 
recent blueprint … 
The now-ness of a pervasive “desire called utopia”,520 of a groundswell of support “for exiting 
the series,”521 is easily narrated. Take the Utopian negativity of Brexit and add one false 
revolution in medical testing (Theranos), a sprinkling of flawed attempt to create an island 
‘paradise’ for millennials (Fyre), widespread public support for and opposition to the 
authoritarian pursuit of ‘order’, ‘stability’ and ‘progress’ (Bolsanaro, Erdoğan) and you have a 
sense (and only a sense) of contemporary negativity, of now’s utopian anti-ness. This is a 
narrative  the global, collective truth is not available, not representable.522 As a narrative this 
account self-consciously admits its failure to represent the lives, realities, and experiences of 
billions of people it unforgivably, yet unavoidably, fails to engage with. That does not make 
this narrative a mere fiction (which does not, of course, mean that it is a ‘fact’), just as Le 
Guin’s and Robinson’s science fiction is “fictive” without being mere fiction.523  
Contemporary Utopian possibility lies in the attempt to maintain negativity and anti-ness, to 
move into and stay in a space or moment that calls for the creation of something else, something 
‘next,’ even though its form and content are unimaginable. Despite their failure, hopelessness, 
and deceptiveness, in their sheet anti-ness Brexit, Theranos, Fyre, Bolsanaro’s Brazil and 
Erdoğan’s Turkey manifest a negative, iconoclastic utopianism. International law rejects such 
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utopianism, preferring to neutralise attempts to neutralise what is by staying within its / the 
existing form(s), and it is in this sense that international law is a “degenerate utopia.”  
4. International Law and Louis Marin’s “Degenerate Utopia” 
If Utopia is “the name of the ‘neutral,’”524 and if “utopic practice …[is] an ideological critique 
of the dominant ideology,”525 then “a degenerate utopia is ideology changed into the form of a 
myth.”526  
A “degenerate utopia” counteracts the neutralising efforts of utopic practice by stabilising 
ideology in fixed, mythical form. International law, as an “ideological discourse”,527 is “a 
closed conceptual system” – treaties, state practice, opinio juris, jus cogens, obligations erga 
omnes, concepts of territory, statehood, jurisdiction – “[that] provid[es] a legitimizing … 
justificatory representation of the world.”528 This is an image of legal texts, norms, institutions 
and processes as guarantors of order and harmony, as effective means of controlling and 
stabilising lives, realities, and events.  
Under the banner of a “culture of formalism” Martti Koskenniemi’s work on international legal 
history and theory amounts to an “ideological discourse”-type understanding of international 
law.529 Formalism’s value, according to Koskenniemi, lies in its openness, its status as “a 
practice that builds on formal arguments that are available to all under conditions of 
equality.”530 Koskenniemi’s “culture of formalism” serves as a code of professional ethics, 
expressing the conviction that:  
when professional men and women engage in an argument about what is lawful and what is 
not, they are engaged in a politics that imagines the possibility of a community overriding 
particular alliances and preferences and allowing a meaningful distinction between lawful 
constraint and the application of naked power.531 
At its core, formalism means that “‘whether we like it or not, law is based on words, words 
formulated in statutes, in treaties, in conventions, in customary law.’”532 Those “words” create 
the structure within which legal practice operates, generating a sense of international law as a 
practice of “being ‘within’.”533 Koskenniemi’s approach seeks to discover qualifiedly utopian 
possibilities within the existing international legal structure:534 
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Formalism’s utopian moment lies in its resistance towards being reduced to structure (which 
is anyway indeterminate) or pure subjectivity ([Carl] Schmitt’s “decision”), and in its 
identifying itself as a practice of decision-making that persists in time and through which 
the aspirations of self-determining communities remain alive – even as (or perhaps precisely 
because) the universal they embody remains only a “horizon.”535  
Whilst formalism may have some measure of “resistance” to “structure” it remains 
fundamentally structural; there is no form without structure, without the “words.” 
Indeterminacies in international law’s structure make international law “a practice of decision-
making,” and there are opportunities for “critique and contestation” within the gaps in the 
structure,536 but the structure fixes the scope of any decision and the limits of critique. There is 
nothing utopian, in Marin’s and Jameson’s sense, in this position. Implicitly opposing 
iconoclastic efforts to neutralise, negate, and write “World other,” Koskenniemi understands 
Utopia as a limited opportunity for legal-professional creativity within what is, in the same way 
that visitors to Disneyland can only discover “Disney’s utopia”:  
Disney’s utopia really is not a utopia. … [T]he visitors to Disneyland are put in the place of 
the ceremonial storyteller. They recite the mythic narrative of the antagonistic origins of 
society. Their path through the park is the narrative, recounted umpteen times, of the 
deceptive harmonization of contrary elements, of the fictional solution to conflicting 
tensions. By “acting out” Disney’s utopia, the visitor “realizes” the ideology of America’s 
dominant groups as the mythic founding narrative of their own society.537 
Eugene D. Hill, commenting on Marin’s Disneyland analysis, observes that “Disneyland … 
[is] immobiliz[ed] in ideology … function[ing] more like a myth: it papers over the 
contradictions instead of allowing them to ‘play’.”538 On Marin’s analysis, play, movement, 
and the absence of fixity or form are central to Utopia.539 In international law the scope for 
such play and movement are heavily constrained by structures of “words,” making international 
law a structured, ordered space of stabilisation, rather than a utopian space of neutralisation, 
negation and possibility.  
Disneyland and international law appear utopian to their visitors by re-presenting extant reality 
in mythical form,540 “immobiliz[ing it] in ideology … [and] paper[ing] over the 
contradictions.”541 Visitors are pulled into this ideology and reality’s “contradictions” 
disappear from their view as they play a part in the presentation of the ideology they have paid 
to consume. “Disneyland is,” according to Marin, “the representation of the makeup of 
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contemporary American ideology” and that representation is “put into play” in the theme park 
as “‘stage’.”542 “[T]his ‘stage’ … is really not a stage” however, because “[t]he visitors to 
Disneyland” and to international law – those who invest international law with a supposed 
capacity to secure Utopia, who look to international law to address conflict, human rights 
abuse, or climate change, in a spirit much like that of the visitors who come to Disneyland in 
an effort to escape from external, non-Disney reality – “are on stage themselves … actors in 
the performance in which they act … captured, like a rat in a maze, and … alienated by their 
part without being aware of performing a part.”543  
The visitor becomes an actor in Disney’s show, passing through a series of limits that the theme 
park imposes on the world’s external reality. The first limit is the “parking lot” that symbolises 
“the visitor’s adjustment to a certain system of signs and behaviour, the system of playful 
symbols, the free field of consumption for nothing, the passeist and aleatory tour in the 
show.”544 Next comes the “ticket booths” where the visitor buys “Disneyland money, with 
which they can take part in ‘utopian’ life.”545 Visitors are divorced from the real world, “leaving 
behind the car … [and] abandon[ing] their money,”546 in a process that “[n]eutraliz[es] both 
the car and money,”547 just as the student of international law leaves the ‘real’ world behind as 
she learns the language of consistent and uniform state practice and uti possidetis juris.   
The centre of Disneyland, Main Street USA, is “the locus of [Disneyland’s] ... societal truth – 
consumption,”548 somewhere to “buy, in a nineteenth-century American decor, actual and real 
commodities with … real, actual money.”549 Main Street USA leads visitors into Fantasyland 
where visitors encounter “images, characters, and animals of the tales illustrated by Disney in 
his animated films,”550 many “made living by their transformation into real materials … and 
through their animation by men and women disguised as movie or storybook characters.”551 In 
Fantasyland “[i]mage … becomes real, but … reality is [also] changed into image” so that “the 
visitor who .. left reality outside finds it again … as a real ‘imaginary’: a fixed, stereotyped, 
powerful fantasy.”552 Here the visitor’s Utopian “wish is caught in [fantasy’s] …snare” as 
“[t]he other side of reality is presented … in the form of banal, routine images of Disney’s 
films … the bankrupt signs of an imagination homegenized by the mass media.”553 Marin 
defines “the fantasy” at work here as “an inert, blocked, and recurrent image” associated with 
“the collective, totalitarian form taken by the ‘imaginary’ of a society, blocked by its specular 
[mirror-like] self-image.”554  
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“Disneyland is on the side of the fantasy and not on that of a free or utopic representation.”555 
There is nothing negative – nothing that negates – in Disneyland. Visitors are offered a 
fantastical representation of reality, an image of America’s industrial-technological society, a 
quasi-religious celebration of reality’s human-ness. Frontierland, with its “mule-train mines of 
precious metals and steamboats on the Mississippi,”556 celebrates “penetration into and victory 
over the lands of the first inhabitants,”557 a monument to “the ever-increasing American 
appropriation of land and resource.”558 Adventureland represents “the outside geographical 
world” with “primitive cannibals rising on the riverbanks [who] seem to repeat the gestures 
that Indians made in Frontierland.”559 America’s history, as represented in Frontierland, and 
the geography of places beyond America, as represented in Adventureland, are “assimilated” 
and “neutralized” by their fantastical representation to Disneyland’s visitors;560 history and 
geography are brought within and made subject to human cognition and control as aspects of 
“a human world, entirely made by the human mind.”561   
In the final stage of Disneyfication, Tomorrowland offers the visitor an image of the future 
centred on “the Carousel of Progress, a gift of the General Electric Corporation”:562  
[T]he visitor becomes a spectator, immobilized and passive, seated in front of a circular and 
moving stage that shows successive scenes taken from family life in the nineteenth century, 
in the beginning of the twentieth century, today, and tomorrow. It is the same family that is 
presented in these different historical periods; the story of this “permanent” family is told to 
visitors, who no longer narrate their own story. History is neutralized; the scenes only 
change in relation to the increasing quantity of electric implements, the increasing 
sophistication of the utensil-dominated human environment. … Men and women adapt 
perfectly to this environment and “act” mechanically.563  
Disneyland enacts “[t]he Myth of Technological Progress.”564 The frontier is overcome, the 
outside is brought inside, and the future is mapped through technologies that guarantee the 
human-ness of all reality, securing “a [past, present and future] human world [that is] entirely 
made by the human mind.”565  
Like Disneyland, international law offers “the fictional solution to conflicting tensions”:566 
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[I]nternational law’s value and its misery lie in its being the fragile surface of political 
community among social agents – States, other communities, individuals – who disagree 
about their preferences but do this within a structure that invites them to argue in terms of 
an assumed universality.567 
The assumption of this “universality” means that an international legal “Utopia is perfectly 
present, but … only as a representation … [whose] harmony exists only on [international law’s] 
… [Disney-like] stage,”568 on its “fragile surface.” “[T]he work of utopic fiction” – the utopian 
aspirations for “World other” illustrated in the work of authors like Le Guin and Robinson – 
“is embedded and immobilized in an ideological figure”  in the formal structure of 
international law  “restrict[ing utopia’s] … play so that it no longer represents the true 
conflicts men and women imagine themselves having.”569  
In international law’s formal structure, as in Disneyland’s theme park, the possibility of a 
utopian neutralisation of what is in pursuit of “World other” is neutralised by fantastical, 
degenerate representations of contemporary reality as Utopia. The UN Charter offers the 
fantasy of a unified global community  “We the peoples of the United Nations”570  
neutralising the possibility of a truly utopian response to inter-national conflict, grounded in 
the history of the “true conflicts” between peoples. Despite the probability of global 
temperature rises in excess of 1.5°C in the relatively short term (2030 to 2052) and the 
catastrophic consequences that will result,571 the UNFCCC system  the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992),572 the Kyoto Protocol (1997),573 and the 
Paris Agreement (2015)574  continues to pursue the objective of “prevent[ing] dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”575 In doing so the UNFCCC system, like 
Disneyland, operates “on the side of the fantasy and not on that of a free or utopic 
representation” of extant reality and the imperative for “World other.”576  
The same can be said of the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’).577 The CBD’s 
preamble affirms 196 states parties’ “[d]etermin[ation] to conserve and sustainably use 
biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations.”578 In 2010 parties to the 
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CBD adopted a set of targets – the “Aichi Biodiversity Targets”579 – designed to address 
ongoing global biodiversity loss. The approach taken is illustrated in these two targets:  
Target 5: By 2020, the rate of loss of all natural habitats, including forests, is at least halved 
and where possible brought close to zero, and degradation and fragmentation is significantly 
reduced.580 
Target 11: By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 per cent of 
coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically 
representative and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based 
conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes.581 
A 2014 assessment of progress towards the Aichi targets in the journal Science was pessimistic: 
“[D]espite accelerating policy and management responses to the biodiversity crisis, the impacts 
of these efforts are unlikely to be reflected in improved trends in the state of biodiversity by 
2020.”582 The authors’ “projections indicate[d] no significant improvement or a worsening 
situation by 2020, relative to 2010,”583 and they concluded that “efforts need to be redoubled 
to positively affect trajectories of change and enable global biodiversity goals to be met by the 
end of the current decade.”584 This 2014 conclusion is all the more negative when seen in the 
context of the CBD parties’ failure to achieve their previous 2002 target of a significant 
reduction in the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010.585  
 
Notwithstanding past and (in 2014) projected future failure to meet global biodiversity targets, 
a May 2018 paper in Science calls for another set of global biodiversity targets, using the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement as a template for a new “global deal.”586 The IPCC’s report on the 
impacts of global warming above 1.5°C, discussed above,587 was released in October 2018, 
approximately five months after this Science paper’s publication. The October report makes 
the improbability of achieving the Paris climate targets, and the inadequacy of those targets 
even if they are achieved, clear.588 And yet, at around the same time, the May 2018 Science 
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paper is optimistic about the “flexible architecture” of the Paris Agreement and the possibility 
of combining that architecture with an enhanced contribution from the private sector:589  
 
[I]f they join the [new global biodiversity] accord [that the 2018 paper calls for], leading 
corporations and associations in the sea-food, forestry, agricultural, and insurance industries 
should be involved in establishing the targets for marine, terrestrial, and coastal habitat and 
biodiversity conservation. … [A]s part of the global agreement for biodiversity, individual 
companies should pledge their own business targets, policies, and timelines for attaining the 
overall industry goal.590 
 
Thought and action have become so insulated from the fundamental, systemic nature of present 
reality, so dominated by postmodern consumption and commodification,591 that even in the 
face of an inescapably systemic environmental crisis and a failure to achieve past global 
biodiversity targets an extension of the extant system’s consumptive, commodified, corporate 
logic is seen, in this May 2018 paper, as the appropriate response. The reality of a future which 
does not involve ever increasing rates of biodiversity loss is represented, formalised and 
institutionalised in the CBD’s texts, processes, and secretariat so that it “becomes real, but … 
[in the process] reality is [also] changed into image”;592 so that global social and political 
engagement with biodiversity loss becomes a formal, legal, technical exercise of targets, 
targets, and more targets. In this way the CBD operates “on the side of the [stultifying, self-
perpetuating] fantasy” that global biodiversity loss can be addressed in ways that do not involve 
direct confrontation with the system of commodification and consumption.593 In this way, like 
the UN Charter and the UNFCCC system, the CBD is “an inert, blocked and recurrent 
image,”594 a “degenerate utopia.” 
 
The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’) are perhaps the most compelling example 
of international legal governance and norm-setting as a Disney-esque “degenerate utopia.” 
Reviving the UN Charter’s “[w]e the peoples” for the twenty-first century  despite being 
authored by “the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives, meeting at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York from 25 to 27 September 2015”595  the SDGs insist 
that “it is ‘we the peoples’ who are embarking … on the road to 2030” through “an Agenda of 
the people, by the people and for the people.”596 Promising a utopia of “‘win-win’ cooperation 
which can bring huge gains to all countries and all parts of the world,”597 this is a 
“Tomorrowland” of unprecedented global co-operation and progress across the full range of 
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governance issues (poverty, food security, gender equality, access to water, energy security, 
and climate change, to name just some).598 
The SDGs commit the “peoples” of the world to, for example, “[e]nd[ing] poverty in all its 
forms everywhere” / “[b]y 2030, eradicat[ing] extreme poverty for all people everywhere, 
currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day.”599 The two versions of the goal 
– one without the qualifier “extreme” and the quantifier “$1.25 a day,” the other with – reflect 
the need for a poster version, on sale in something like the Main Street USA gift shop,600 and 
a policy-speak version for implementation and verification. After all, outright opposition to 
“poverty” per se sells better than mere qualified opposition to “extreme poverty.”  
The SDGs respond indirectly to Philip Allott’s call for a “re-imagin[ation of] the human 
world.”601 They are a programme, akin to Allott’s draft treaties in Eunomia,602 based on the 
assumption that reality is human and that a better world can be built through the codification 
of collective intentions.603 Allott’s faith in a unified global community is more strident than the 
SDGs’ – he prefers “we, the people” to the UN Charter’s and SDGs’ “we the peoples” 
because,604 in his view, “[i]nternational society is the society of the whole human race and the 
society of all societies.”605 But the phrasing in his 1990 draft treaties (“[w]e undertake to do 
everything possible to eliminate the practice of war”) anticipates the tone and style of the SDGs 
(“[w]e are determined to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions”).606  
Like Disneyland, the SDGs re-present extant reality as a fantasy of ongoing human progress: 
“Within the past generation, hundreds of millions of people have emerged from extreme 
poverty … The spread of information and communications technology and global 
interconnectedness has great potential to accelerate human progress.”607 In the SDGs there is 
no sense that the causes of poverty, environmental degradation, or food shortages are systemic; 
that the conditions in which human beings live are, ultimately, the product of processes of 
industrialisation, production and commodification that might be bound together under the label 
‘capitalism.’ The SDG’s fantasy is sustained and promoted by Project Everyone, “a team of 
communications and campaigns specialists” founded by film director Richard Curtis (Four 
Weddings and A Funeral, Love Actually), “who sit at the heart of a global network of 
campaigning organisations, private sector partners, brands, governments, UN agencies, public 
figures, and social influencers.”608  
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The Global Goals website, constructed by Project Everyone, features one brightly coloured 
square for each SDG in a format similar, in style and presentation, to Fyre festival’s orange 
tile.609 Each square contains a few words for each SDG – “No Poverty,” “Zero Hunger,” “Good 
Health and Well-Being,” “Quality Education,” “Gender Equality.”610 The website lists “Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation Goalkeepers” – Ed Sheeran (musician), Emmanuel Macron 
(President of France), Erna Solberg (Prime Minister of Norway), Melinda Gates (“global 
advocate for women and girls”).611 Results are measured in the fantastical reality of metrics 
and “top-tier media” engagement, rather than through peoples’ lived experiences:   
Impact and Results: This year [2018] more than 80 journalists from around the world 
participated in the events and awards, with 300 original stories and opinion pieces written. 
The event and report were covered by top-tier media titles such as CNN, Vox, Quartz, The 
Financial Times, The New York Times, National Geographic, Elle, NPR and many more. 
In addition, over 859k digital engagements with the report content were tracked, 25 million 
engagements with content from the event, and 530 meaningful actions taken by the 
Goalkeepers to progress the Goals [the term “meaningful actions” is not defined].612 
As “on [Disney’s] Main Street USA … reality reemerges in a mediated system of collective 
representations and figures.”613 In Disneyland, “as the cartoons become real, they also deform 
and disguise reality,” 614 and the same can be said of the SDGs, with their reduction of reality 
to metrics, “digital engagements” and “meaningful actions.”  
In March 2019 it was reported that students on the ‘Internet and New Media’ course at China’s 
Henan University were required to make at least one thousand new friends on Chinese social 
media app WeChat in order to pass an assignment.615 The thinking behind that assignment 
echoes Project Everyone’s media(ted), metricised logic. Distinguishing lived experience from 
metrics, a student on the course reportedly commented “WeChat friends are not equal to real 
friends. Is this not just malicious marketing?”616 Even if it is there is a very real market for this 
unreality, as the South China Morning Post reports: 
Some people … have bought the accounts of WeChat users to mine for data and to use as 
part of click farms to inflate traffic … [with] a one month-old WeChat account [selling] for 
                                                          
609 See text at n 502.  
610 See Global Goals, <https://www.globalgoals.org/> (last visited 2nd August 2019).  
611 See Gates Foundation, <https://www.gatesfoundation.org/goalkeepers/> (last visited 2nd August 2019).  
612 Project Everyone, <http://www.project-everyone.org/case-studies/goalkeepers-2018/> (last visited 2nd August 
2019).  
613 Marin, Utopics (n 4) 248.  
614 Ibid.  
615 Sarah Jenkins and Kerry Allen, “Chinese students graded on number of WeChat friends,” 13th March 2019, 
BBC Trending, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-47554676> (last visited 2nd August 2019); Lee 
Jeong-ho, “Chinese university puts students to WeChat test to pass social media course,” 17th March 2019, South 
China Morning Post, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3002055/chinese-university-puts-
students-wechat-test-pass-social-media> (last visited 2nd August 2019).  
616 Jenkins and Allen, n 615.  
70 
 
around 55 yuan (US$8.19) but a two year-old WeChat account with real-name registration 
… [potentially] cost[ing] around 230 yuan.617 
Borrowing language from Susan Marks’ analysis of the human rights movement  and, to be 
clear, Marks is not discussing the SDGs here  the SDGs, like the CBD and the UNFCCC 
system, “keep the focus fixed on individual decisions, policies and behaviours … [becoming] 
bound up with the processes of systemic self-reproduction.”618 As Marks notes “change unfolds 
within a context that includes systematic constraints and pressures,”619 and yet the SDGs 
maintain that with sufficient will and cooperation “the journey [will be] … successful and its 
gains irreversible.”620 Such “voluntarist modes of thought … mask the systematicity, and in 
that sense necessity, of existing configurations of forces and relations”621 – the systemic causes 
of poverty, exclusion, domination, environmental degradation, and inequality – creating a 
“degenerate utopia,” a fantastical, theme park re-presentation of reality that neutralises utopian 
efforts to negate the extant system.  
Part 4: Towards “World other” 
1. Exiting International Law’s Series 
Thomas Skouteris highlights the structural importance of progressive rhetoric in international 
law, in an effort to “begin a debate about how [international law’s] … professional community 
constructs / is constructed by progress narratives.”622 Skouteris considers notions of progress 
in the interwar work of Greek international lawyer Stelios Seferiades, international law’s 
doctrine of sources, and recent growth in the number of international courts and tribunals. He 
concludes that by “[r]evealing the exclusions of progress narratives and contesting their 
exclusive right to speak the world ‘as it is’” discourse analysis, of the kind undertaken in his 
book, is a valuable form of “action.”623 His analysis operates “within” international law’s 
structure,624 reflecting Koskenniemi’s call for “critique and contestation” by opening that 
structure up to debate and challenge.625 
The “degenerate utopia” perspective presented here is sceptical about the value of such critical 
inquiries. In opposition to the analysis of existing international legal structures, the analysis 
offered here posits the admittedly disturbing notion that any understanding of international law 
limited to its existing, discursive structure will, to a greater or lesser extent, support its 
continued operation as a distracting fantasy, diverting attention away from the very real 
imperative for “World other” concretised in the contemporary reality of climate change. Any 
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form of blueprint utopianism – Cassese’s, Koskenniemi’s, Allott’s or Moyn’s  misunderstands 
the utopian inheritance of literature stretching from Thomas More to Ursula Le Guin and Kim 
Stanley Robinson,626 presenting Utopia as something to be planned and created when its true, 
creative function is to hold open the possibility of an exit from or neutralisation of extant social, 
political, economic and cultural conditions.627  
In previous work, and in opposition to Susan Marks’ emphasis on the need to understand why 
international law is as it is, I have argued for attempts to write another international law into 
being, calling for a re-imageination of international law.628 A re-imageined international law 
would step beyond existing forms, established traditions and consolidated cultures and, whilst 
I did not use the language of iconoclasm or utopianism in making that argument, its rejection 
of existing international law is both iconoclastic and utopian. My argument in this article is, in 
a sense, a continuation and development of my earlier re-imageination argument, and it re-
plays and develops the disagreement, explored as part of my re-imageination argument, with 
Marks’s emphasis on “explanatory analysis.”629 
As a critical perspective Marks’ concept of “false contingency” is an invaluable tool for the 
critique of voluntarist, blueprint perspectives that pay insufficient attention to the social, 
political, cultural and economic factors that limit prospects for fundamental change.630 If, 
however, any capacity international law may have to foster fundamental change is neutralised 
by the discursive formation of international legal fantasies or “degenerate utopias” that re-
present reality as “an inert, blocked, and recurrent image” (the UNFCCC system or the SDGs 
for example),631 then analysis of existing structures is insufficient. What is needed, instead, is 
a theory of the form of practice required to move from what is towards “World other.” On that 
basis I argue that the utopic practice theorised and illustrated in Marin’s, Jameson’s, 
Robinson’s and Le Guin’s work  a practice that actively seeks to get outside the existing 
structure in an effort to explore the “possibilit[ies] above [the existing] order”632  is preferable 
to critical perspectives, including Marks’ argument for “explanatory analysis,” that operate 
within existing international legal discourse.633 
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632 See Adorno quotation at n 62.   
633 See Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 383) 108: “It is only be risking the discipline [of international law], by 
abandoning [quoting Benjamin] “the intention of preserving the law itself”, that we can truly address international 
law’s violence.” See also ibid 109: “Re-imageination insists that we can make international law into something 
different from its current material reality by writing that something different into being. Whilst writing it into 
being will not bring it into being as a material reality – and, in that sense, I agree with Marks that “the meaning 
of emancipation is not a matter of scholarly fiat but a process of social struggle” [quoting Susan Marks, The Riddle 
of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology (OUP, 2000), 137] – writing is 
the necessary first step to living it.”  
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In recent work, co-authored with Andrew Lang, Marks advocates fundamental change in 
international legal discourse, noting the need for a “remaking of the frameworks of knowledge 
which structure [international lawyers’] … engagement with the world.”634 Writing in 2017 
Lang and Marks suggest that Walter Benjamin’s work might hold the key to a re-invention of 
international legal history “not simply as a set of facts to be known, but as a force to be felt, a 
secret sympathy to be sensed, and an occasion to be grasped for producing new artefacts that 
might be used to activate new connections”;635 a re-invention driven by the conviction that 
“[w]e can seize the past and bring it into active relation to the present.”636 Writing in 2015, I 
argued for a Benjaminian, “allegorical-representational” practice of international law in which:  
there is no set of texts or concepts which the [international legal] practitioner must use; the 
responsibility for constellating texts, concepts, aspects or fragments of reality to be included 
in or excluded from [each international legal] representation rests with the practitioner. 
Everything ever written or created by anyone, anywhere and everything that exists or has 
ever existed is a potential fragment, to be included in or excluded from the representation. 
The allegorical-representational practitioner must “immerse himself in the real in order to 
dislodge its objective interpretation” … for “truth content is only to be grasped through 
immersion in the most minute details of subject-matter.”637 
Lang and Marks see critical, transformative potential in Koskenniemi’s attachment to 
international legal form and tradition, embracing the notion that international law “is made up 
of beliefs, practices, habits and unwritten rules which are handed down and carried forward 
within the community of international lawyers.”638 They suggest that “Lauterpacht”  that is, 
early-to-mid twentieth century international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht, whose work 
Koskenniemi considers in the process of building a sense of international law’s form and 
culture 639  “becomes a ‘bridge’ which connects us to the past … not just in a symbolic way, 
but also through our senses.”640  
Whilst Lang and Marks explore the possibility of “producing new artefacts” out of and from 
within international legal history,641 I argue that a genuine re-imageination of international law 
can only be achieved after an exit from the established formal, cultural boundaries of 
international law. Consistent with that argument, I propose a re-orientation in thinking about 
international law’s ontology, away from an emphasis on form and tradition and towards the 
notion that international law is a Benjaminian “‘idea’ … (re)formed in and by every 
representation,”642 in and by every international legal argument, every “presentation of an 
                                                          
634 Andrew Lang and Susan Marks, “People With Projects: Writing the Lives of International Lawyers” (2013) 
27(2) Temple International and Comparative Law Quarterly 437, 452.  
635 Andrew Lang and Susan Marks, “Even the Dead Will Not Be Safe: International Law and the Struggle Over 
Tradition” in Wouter Werner, Marieke De Hoon, and Alexis Galán (eds.), The Law of International Lawyers: 
Reading Martti Koskenniemi (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 321, 335.  
636 Ibid (emphasis in original).  
637 Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 383) 119-120 (quoting Beatrice Hanssen and Walter Benjamin).  
638 Lang and Marks, “Even the Dead” (n 635) 322.  
639 See Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer (n 529) 353-412. 
640 Lang and Marks, “Even the Dead” (n 635) 327.  
641 Ibid 335.  
642 Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 383) 124.  
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image of what is, what was, and what should be to an audience.”643 This approach, in line with 
Marin’s emphasis on “exiting the series”,644 is iconoclastically utopian: it is more interested in 
“the possibility above [the extant] order” than in exploring the history of the extant order.645  
Consistent with Lang’s and Mark’s emphasis on “remaking” the structure of international legal 
practice,646 Marks explains her analysis of the human rights system as a structure of “planned 
misery”  “misery that belongs with the logic of particular socio-economic arrangements”647  
in terms of:  
an emphasis on materialist explanations … that account for phenomena not only in terms of 
the ideas informing them, but also in terms of their connections to processes of social 
production … [involving an effort] to delve deeper and ask about the socio-economic 
conditions within which … ideas were able to develop and gain influence.648  
For Marks, this approach has a “repoliticising thrust … geared less to problem-solving and the 
elaboration of remedial proposals … than to the strategic task of channelling grievances into 
organised and coherent action.”649 Acknowledging that this kind of “explanatory analysis 
cannot itself specify the forms of [organised and coherent] … action,”650 Marks argues that it 
“can be understood in ways that contribute more and less to effective political mobilisation.”651  
To be in any sense “effective” the “explanatory analysis” that Marks promotes would need to 
generate “political mobilisation” capable of undermining the “mediated system” behind 
campaigns like Project Everyone’s Global Goals initiative.652 Explanatory analysis and 
attempts to “[produce] new artefacts” by “activat[ing] new connections” in international legal 
history cannot,653 I suggest, contend with the commodified, consumerist power  the sheer 
marketability  of blueprints and “degenerate utopias.” Academic critique of, for example, the 
“false contingency” behind campaigns like Project Everyone is as intellectually sound as it is 
socially and politically ineffective.654 ‘No poverty’ is a more saleable slogan, than, say, ‘let’s 
investigate the social, economic, political, cultural and historic causes of global poverty’  the 
short version may lack explanatory power but the long version would not fit on a Fyre-style 
orange tile.655  
International lawyers ‘buy’ and invest in utopian blueprints, as the analysis in part two shows, 
and SDG-type, target-based global governance projects are a global industry. Critical projects 
within international legal history and “explanatory analysis” of extant social and political 
                                                          
643 Ibid 123.  
644 See Marin quotation at n 20.  
645 See Adorno quotation at n 62. 
646 See quotation at n 634.  
647 Marks, “Human Rights” (n 618) 75.  
648 Ibid 76.  
649 Ibid 76-77. 
650 Ibid 77.   
651 Ibid.  
652 “mediated system” – see Marin quotation at n 613, and see text at n 608 to n 613 generally.  
653 “artefacts” / “connections” – see Lang and Marks quotation at n 635.  
654 On “false contingency” see text at n 217 and at n 618 to n 621.  
655 “orange tile” – see text at n 502.  
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structures seem grounded in the supposed susceptibility of marketised reality to rational 
inquiry, as though that reality was an aspect of social, political and cultural life. The postmodern 
reality is, however, that the market, with its processes of commodification and consumption, 
sets the terms of contemporary social, political and cultural life, including the limits of what 
can be achieved through intellectual, explanatory, historical inquiry.656 The starting point, in 
these lamentable circumstances, lies not in intellectual analysis per se but in an attempt to 
identify – as my argument for the re-imageination of international law attempts to do – an 
approach to international law that connects with the contemporary fashion for and sheer 
marketability of “exiting the series”.657  
The foregoing analysis of international legal blueprintism, international law as a “degenerate 
utopia,” and the limitations of critical and historical inquiry within international law, combined 
with contemporary, postmodern, marketized conditions and the realities of climate change, lead 
me to suggest that iconoclastic utopianism is the only way to maintain the idea that international 
law offers a path towards a better future. That path runs via an exit from what is towards an 
unspecified, unknowable “World other.” As fantasy and science fiction author China Miéville 
puts it, “if we take utopia seriously, as a total reshaping, its scale means we can’t think it from 
this side. It’s the process of making it that will allow us to do so.”658 
Iconoclastic Utopias, involving a run to an exit that leads who-knows-where, sell – think Brexit, 
Theranos, Fyre, Bolsanaro’s Brazil, Erdoğan’s Turkey. In his analysis of U.S. mega-retailer 
Wal-Mart as a curiously utopian entity Fredric Jameson highlights Utopia’s contemporary 
retail value.659 My ultimate point, inspired by Jameson’s Wal-Mart example, and elaborated in 
the next and final section, is that for international law to play any role in the creation of “World 
other” it needs to become an iconoclastic marketing tool, representing and promoting a utopian 
exit from what is. In doing so an iconoclastic, utopian international law must adopt the 
commodified, consumerist logic of the extant order purely as a means of selling and moving 
towards the “possibility above [that] order.”660 Deborah Cook captures the negative essence of 
this agenda in her insistence that “[c]riticism of damaged life can do no more than to raise the 
spectre of what is other, the nonidentical, by using concepts [and, perhaps, examples] that are 
themselves contaminated by what exists.”661  
The project is not, then, about the “channelling [of] grievances into organised and coherent 
action” through “explanatory analysis” that highlights extant structures of “planned misery,”662 
for all that this approach has immense intellectual value. The project I am proposing involves 
a deformalized, representational, utopic practice of international law, a practice that draws on 
                                                          
656 On this theme see Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception” in Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Verso, 1997 [1944]) 120.  
657 “exiting the series” – see Marin quotation at n 20.  
658 China Miéville, “The Limits of Utopia,” <https://climateandcapitalism.com/2018/03/02/china-mieville-the-
limits-of-utopia/> (last visited 2nd August 2019).  
659 See Fredric Jameson, “Utopia as Replication” in Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (Verso, 2010) 410.   
660 Adorno, Negative Dialectics (n 62) 397: “An order that shuts itself up in its own meaning will shut itself away 
from the possibility above order” (also quoted at n 62, n 95 and n 459).  
661 Deborah Cook, “From the Actual to the Possible: Nonidentity Thinking” (2005) 12(1) Constellations 21, 30.  
662 See text at n 649 to n 650, and n 647.  
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“[e]verything ever written or created by anyone, anywhere and everything that exists or has 
ever existed [as] a potential fragment, to be included in or excluded from [each international 
legal] representation.”663 This is a concept of international law as an iconoclastic marketing 
tool that re-presents the extant order to itself as an order that is in the process of negating itself, 
in the hope that such re-presentation expedites the move towards “World other.” As Marin puts 
it, “Utopia is a fictive construction” – a marketing tool, perhaps – “which produces it [Utopia] 
through determinate (rhetoric-poetic) discursive operations and plays across the narrative as a 
relatively free and independent representation … in which, figuratively, the other or negative 
of contemporary social reality appears.”664  
In a sense, by analysing extant international law – the UNFCCC system, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the SDGs  as a “degenerate utopia,” I have been trying (and only trying)  
to make “the other or negative” appear. I have, in the course of this article, been attempting to 
step out of the extant international legal order by engaging with the utopian scholarship of 
Marin and Jameson, the utopian fiction of Le Guin and Robinson, and the exit-oriented reality 
of contemporary social phenomena from Brexit to Erdoğan’s Turkey, in order to re-present the 
extant international legal order as a Disneyesque fantasy.665 Whether my efforts have achieved 
anything is, of course, not for me to say, but the objective is an Umfunktionierung, a “functional 
transformation” in international legal scholarship:666 a shift in the function of international legal 
theory and scholarship from internal inquiry into international legal discourse’s own structure, 
boundaries, history, culture and form, to an external perspective, focused on the societal, 
representational, mediative, and fantastical impact that extant international law has on 
contemporary reality.667 This Umfunktionierung is driven by the conviction that the external 
perspective has a utopian capacity (entirely absent from the internal perspective) to move 
towards possibilities above and outside the extant order.668  
“[I]f thinking is to be true – if it is to be true today, in any case – it must also be a thinking 
against itself.”669  
2. Selling the Negation  
Jameson conceptualises Wal-Mart as:  
the contemporary version of what Marx called the negation of the negation … not an 
aberration or an exception, but rather the purest expression of that dynamic of capitalism 
which devours itself, which abolishes the market by means of the market itself.670 
                                                          
663 Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin” (n 383) 120.  
664 Marin, “Theses” (n 394) 72 (emphasis in original).  
665 Rasulov (n 98) highlights the fantastical quality of international law (see Rasulov quotation in n 101) but – 
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669 Ibid 365.  
670 Jameson, “Utopia as Replication” (n 659) 421.  
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Reciting various allegations against this mega-business – that it “drives local businesses 
under,” “reduces available jobs,” “scarcely pay[s] a living wage … is anti-union (except in 
China),” “hires illegal immigrants,” “increasingly emphasizes part-time work,” “drives 
American businesses abroad,” “promotes sweatshops and child labor outside the country,” 
“exercises a reign of terror over its own suppliers,” and “destroys whole ecologies abroad and 
whole communities here in the US”671  Jameson situates Wal-Mart within a wider global 
system. That system involves “the so-called bar code” that stores and transmits vast amounts 
of information.672 It also involves “containerization … a revolution in transport” providing a 
common means of transport – the shipping container – for all types, sizes and shapes of 
commodity,673 replacing the disordered process of longshoremen packing individual items into 
a ship’s hold with identical cranes in virtually identical ports loading identical boxes onto 
virtually identical ships.674  
In the words of “a nameless CEO … ‘they [Wal-Mart] have killed free-market capitalism in 
America’.”675 “[N]ot an aberration or an exception,”676 Jameson identifies Wal-Mart as “the 
purest expression of that dynamic of capitalism which devours itself.”677 It has the “capacity to 
reduce inflation … and to make life affordable for the poorest Americans” whilst being “the 
very source of their poverty … the prime mover in the dissolution of American industrial 
productivity.”678 In this sense, Wal-Mart is the expression of “the historically unique and 
dialectical dynamic of capitalism itself as a system.”679 It embodies the “dialectic[al] … 
injunction to think the negative and the positive together at one and the same time, in the unity 
of a single thought,”680 the need to think against and outside of what is from within it.681   
Whilst a “moralizing” response to Wal-Mart “wants to have the luxury of condemning this evil 
without particularly imagining anything else in its place,”682 the utopian response approaches 
Wal-Mart:  
as a thought experiment … [as evidence of] what Raymond Williams calls the emergent, as 
opposed to the residual – the shape of a Utopian future looming through the mist, which we 
must seize as an opportunity to exercise the Utopian imagination more fully, rather than an 
occasion of moralizing judgments or regressive nostalgia.683  
                                                          
671 Ibid 420.  
672 Ibid 422.  
673 Ibid 422.  
674 See Tim Harford, “The simple steel box that transformed global trade” 9th January 2017, BBC News,  
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What Jameson says of Wal-Mart applies, in my view, to Brexit, Theranos, Fyre, Bolsanaro’s 
Brazil, and Erdoğan’s Turkey. The desire for an exit, manifested in these situations, calls for 
something more meaningful than a “moralizing,” condemnatory response or a nostalgic 
evocation of liberal democratic stability (Turkey and Brazil), sovereignty (Brexit), or some 
notional history of responsible, well-regulated corporations (Theranos and Fyre). These 
situations and phenomena speak to the nature and limitations of contemporary reality and the 
strength of utopian desire for an exit from it. Whilst populist, opportunistic, authoritarian 
politics and misleading corporate schemes that exist only in the media (Instagram in the case 
of Fyre, Fortune magazine for Theranos) are not to be celebrated,684 they cannot be wished 
away.  
The sketch of international law as a “degenerate utopia” above needs to be approached in the 
same way. It cannot be dismissed by condemnation, overcome by a moralising, idealistic 
response in the style of Philip Allott, or remedied by “regressive nostalgia” for international 
law’s historic form or structure (Koskenniemi and Cassese). It should, I suggest, serve as a 
stimulus that leads international legal thinkers and practitioners to “experimentally declare 
positive things which are clearly negative in our own world, to affirm that dystopia is in reality 
Utopia if examined more closely, [and] to isolate specific features in our empirical present so 
as to read them as components of a different system.”685  
The failure of the UNFCCC system to provide any viable response to expected global 
temperature rises in excess of 1.5°C, the failure of the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
reduce global loss of biodiversity, and the commodified consumerism of the SDGs can be seen 
as positively negative features of extant international law that make the utopian imperative for 
“World other” manifest, serving as the fledging “components” – the pre-cursors –  “of a 
different [international legal] system.” There will, of course, be numerous other positively 
negative features within international law. My aim has not been to offer a comprehensive list 
but to make the case for a methodology, a utopian international legal research agenda, a way 
of identifying such positively negative features.  
This iconoclastic, negative (in the sense that it seeks to negate the extant international legal 
order) international legal utopianism inverts the realism of blueprint international legal 
utopianism. Whilst the Cassese and Koskenniemi variety of blueprint international legal 
utopianism treats extant international law as a frame that fixes the boundaries of possibility, 
the iconoclastic utopianism advocated here critiques extant international law as a “degenerate 
utopia.” It seeks to identify Wal-Mart-type openings in contemporary reality, cracks in the 
supposed stability of reality, that offer a chance to exit from what is by demonstrating that 
extant international law is, in reality, positively negating itself.  
It would not, then, be accurate for ‘realists’ to dismiss iconoclastic utopianism as unrealistic. 
The better view is that blueprint and iconoclastic variants of utopianism simply have divergent 
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views of the relationship between utopia and reality; divergent views on what reality is and, 
most importantly, on utopianism’s role in determining what is real. Blueprintism maintains that 
extant reality defines the nature and structure of international law and the extent of its 
utopianism. Iconoclasm, by contrast, maintains that utopia is a negative, neutralising means of 
re-presenting reality to itself, in pursuit of its own self-transcendence; a method by which extant 
international law can think against and outside of itself from within itself.686  
My aim is not to convince those committed to a blueprint perspective that the iconoclastic 
perspective presented here ought to be preferred – I doubt even an article this long can shake 
their commitment. My aim is to establish and promote an iconoclastic perspective that has, to 
date, been almost entirely absent from international legal theory. Without this perspective 
international legal thinkers and practitioners are caught in “the ideological closure of the system 
in which we are somehow trapped and confined” and,687 more importantly, international law – 
as a field of intellectual inquiry, and as a practical, professional endeavour – is incapable of 
moving extant reality towards “World other” because of its status as a “degenerate utopia.” 
The divergence between blueprint and iconoclastic forms of utopianism centres on historical 
method. The utopianism advocated here involves “a reawakening of that historicity which our 
[extant] system – offering itself as the very end of history – necessarily represses and 
paralyzes.”688 Blueprintism reflects an anti-utopian posture of the kind developed by Popper, 
Berlin and Arendt, imprisoning thought and practice in well-recognised realities and forms,689 
for fear that their overthrow would “sacrifice … present generations for some future utopian 
state.”690 This fear connects with an anti-modern sentiment “in liberal as well as in conservative 
culture” that is suspicious of “mass culture,” the urban, the industrial, and all forms of 
collectivism (most obviously, socialism and communism).691  
That anti-modern sentiment leads to a “standard way of dealing with … social anxieties” – a 
blueprintism – that “assur[es] us that in whatever future ‘more perfect society’ all of the 
negative features it enumerates will have been corrected” through a nostalgic return to what 
was based of the condemnation of what is.692 This can be seen, for example, in Moyn’s call for 
a return to a properly politicised, pre-1970s human rights as a replacement for a post-1970s 
depoliticized, formal human rights;693 in Allott’s insistence on the value of classical, 
Enlightenment political philosophy and the capacity of the human mind to re-create reality, in 
place of the fallen reality of contemporary life and law, including his attack on ‘mass culture’ 
in the form of “bad art and popular culture”;694 and in Koskenniemi’s evocation of a lost, 
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historic international legal formalism that offers the key to a revival in international legal 
culture.695  
The process of correction involves “so many obedient replacements of the reigning negative 
terms by their positive opposites”696 – Jacobin, socialist politics in place of post-1970s 
formalist, minimalist human rights (Moyn); Enlightenment philosophy and its ideal of human 
self-(re)creation in place of the chaos of postmodernity (Allott); a commitment to international 
law’s form in place of international legal pragmatism (Koskenniemi). A “negative diagnosis” 
is the foundation and essence of this regressively nostalgic blueprint utopianism,697 but the 
negativity of the diagnosis has “priority” over the positive blueprint prescription that emerges 
from it.698 If negativity is, then, the source or origin of Utopia blueprints of what will replace 
that which is negated are, at best, a secondary feature of the utopian.    
The twentieth century anti-urban, anti-collectivist sentiment underpinning blueprint 
utopianism is, Jameson argues, incompatible with the urban, collectivist reality of 
“postmodernity and globalisation” apparent in “world population explosion … desertion of the 
countryside and the growth of the mega-city, global warming and ecological catastrophe … 
[and] the universal emergence of small-group politics of all kinds.”699 A utopianism consonant 
with this postmodern, globalised reality involves a move “from anxiety to affirmation,”700 a 
“resituating in a more positive way [of] … contemporary denunciations of contemporary 
society in terms of the spectacle … and the simulacrum.”701  
Embracing the spectacular and the simulated necessitates a re-appraisal of “mass culture” – a 
re-appraisal of Wal-Mart, Project Everyone and the Global Goals campaign, the “degenerate 
utopia” of Disneyland, the exit-oriented utopianism of Brexit, Theranos, Fyre, Bolsanaro’s 
Brazil and Erdoğan’s Turkey, and the manifest belief in international law as a blueprint for a 
better future. “Mass culture” is to be seen as “‘an industry of the means of production,’”702 
something at work, for better or worse, on the process of creating society and reality, “an 
enactment of collective sharing and participation.”703  
The task for international legal thought and practice is not, then, to replace what is with a 
utopian blueprint of how it ought to be, nor is it to critique contemporary legal-social reality 
through “explanatory analysis” designed to spark “effective political mobilisation.”704 The task 
is to sell mass culture’s ongoing self-negation to a mass cultural audience, deliberately 
misappropriating the methods of Project Everyone in a marketing campaign that sells extant 
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international law’s self-negation to the widest possible audience. The message we should be 
selling is that international law has no blueprint for utopia, no plan for a better future; that the 
UNFCCC system is not going to avert catastrophic climate change; that a cataclysmic loss of 
biodiversity will not be averted through the Convention on Biological Diversity; that the 
Sustainable Development Goals will not end poverty.  
I am suggesting that international lawyers should stop telling positive stories about the nature, 
capacity and achievements of international law because doing so perpetuates a “fixed, 
stereotyped, powerful [mass culture] fantasy” of international law as the means of securing a 
better global future.705 In place of such fantastical degeneracy international lawyers should, I 
suggest, offer detailed accounts of extant international law’s inability to address the most 
fundamental challenges, from climate change to global poverty, as evidence of the very 
beginnings of something beyond extant international law, something “World other.” 
Such negative, neutralising, truly utopian accounts would serve as “contribution[s] to the 
reawakening of the imagination of possible and alternative futures;”706 attempts to turn the 
“consumers” – the scholars and practitioners – of extant international law into the “producers” 
of an international law connected to and evolving in response to the negativity of contemporary 
reality.707 The project I am proposing is underpinned by a sense that it is time to “go somewhere 
else … [to] have another goal …[to] walk a different road … [to] stop following the road 
[we]’re on, in either direction … [and to] break the circle.”708  
If “[l]ight is the left hand of darkness, and darkness the right hand of light,”709 then walking 
through the cold negativity of contemporary reality’s darkness offers the best chance of finding 
international legal light. 
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